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Studies on the major cognitive theories consistently indicate that depressed
individuals process information in a selective and negatively biased manner. On the
other hand, there is a body of social cognition research that suggests that depressed
individuals are more extensive and even-handed compared to nondepressed individuals.
The purpose of the two studies presented here was to examine both negative biases and
correction processes during the interpretation of self-referent information in depression.
The presented studies investigated differences in depressed and non-depressed
participants’ judgments about the self-implications of negative events, in hypothetical
(Study 1) and simulated (Study 2) contexts. It was predicted that depressives’ self-
judgments would be characteristically negative in the face of mildly negative and
ambiguous self-relevant information but that depressed individuals would show greater
evidence of correcting these judgments when mitigating information was provided. The
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Depression is considered to be the most common psychological disorder in the
world (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2001), and it has received significant
empirical and theoretical attention in both clinical and social psychology. After the
“cognitive revolution” in these subdisciplines, several theories of depression were
developed to explain the cognitive factors that play a role in the onset, maintenance, and
treatment of the disorder. Two of the most influential cognitive theories in the clinical
literature are Beck’s (1967,1976) cognitive theory of depression and the hopelessness
theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989). These theorists predict that depressed
individuals have a tendency to make overly negative interpretations about the self. These
predictions have received wide support from numerous studies that have shown that
depressed individuals make more negative evaluations and judgments compared to
nondepressed individuals in various contexts related to the self.
Theories and studies in the social-cognition literature on depression have focused
on the judgments and interpretations that depressed individuals make about others. There
is a group of studies in this literature, mostly by Weary and her colleagues, that has
shown that depressed individuals actually make less biased and more hypervigilant
judgments compared to nondepressed individuals rather than unwarranted and overly
negative judgments. Although these findings have not yet been discussed in the context
of self-referent processing, they seem to have important implications for depressives’
self-referent interpretations. The purpose of this review is to examine the two literatures
on depressive interpretation and to integrate the findings into a more comprehensive view
of depression by using Gilbert and colleagues’ stage model of inferences (Gilbert,
Pelham, & Krull, 1988).
Beginning in the 1970s, the cognitive perspective became a predominant force in
the study of emotional disorders and gave rise to several major cognitive theories of
depression. According to these theories, depression is caused and maintained by the
tendency to process self-referent information in a maladaptive and negatively biased
manner. Two theories have been widely researched and particularly influential in the
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conceptualization of depressive information processing: the hopelessness theory
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) and Beck’s (1967,1976) cognitive theory of
depression. The hopelessness theory focuses on the role of maladaptive attributional
styles in depression. It is predicted that individuals who have a tendency to make
negative inferences about the causes and implications of adverse life events are more
vulnerable to developing a sense of hopelessness and, ultimately, depression. Beck’s
theory contends that depression is triggered and maintained by cognitive structures called
depressive schemas. Depressive schemas are constellations of negative attitudes and
beliefs about the self in relation to the future and to the world. Once depressive schemas
are activated, it is predicted that negatively biased cognitive processes will dominate the
processing of information and lead to subsequent feelings of distress and depression.
Numerous studies have provided support for these theories by showing that
depressed individuals have negative biases in attention and memory (e.g., Derry &
Kuiper, 1981; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Matthews & Antes, 1992;
Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). For example, Derry and Kuiper (1981)
found that depressed individuals exhibited significantly enhanced recall for negative self-
referent adjectives, which supports the hypothesis that depressive self-schemas contain
negative content. Overall, it has been found that depressed individuals are more likely to
attend to and remember negative information and ignore positive information.
Another important, but less researched, aspect of depressive information
processing is interpretations regarding the self. Interpretations are the judgments,
inferences, and meanings that individuals generate when confronted with alternative
information and stimuli (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). The major lines of research that
have shown that depressed individuals perceive self-referent information more negatively
than nondepressed individuals are: perceptions of feedback (e.g., Dykman, Abramson,
Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989; Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002; Krantz & Hammen, 1979;
Lowenstein & Hokanson, 1986; Nelson & Craighead, 1977), interpretations of
hypothetical situations (e.g., Krantz & Gallagher-Thompson, 1990; Krantz & Hammen,
1979; Nunn, Mathews, & Trower, 1997) judgments of own performance (e.g., Forgas,
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Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Cane & Gotlib, 1985), attributions for events (Miller & Morretti,
1988), and future-related expectations (e.g., Anderson, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; Cane &
Gotlib, 1985; Gaschke, Braveman, & Evans, 1992). These studies provide strong
evidence that depressed individuals impose negative meanings and reject positive
meanings of self-referent information. This cognitive pattern has been referred to as
“selectivity” by Beck and his colleagues (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999).
Recently, some researchers in the social cognition literature have revealed a
completely different picture of interpretive processes in depression. There is compelling
evidence that depressed individuals process available information in an extensive rather
than selective way and make judgments that are relatively unbiased and situation-
appropriate rather than biased (Edwards & Weary, 1993; Gleicher & Weary, 1991;
Hildebrand-Saints & Weary, 1988; Marsh & Weary, 1989; McCaul, 1983; Weary, Elbin,
& Hill, 1987; Weary, Jordan, & Hill, 1985; Yost & Weary, 1996). Most of these findings
have resulted from investigations of a control-motivation model of depression (Weary,
Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993). According to the model, depression is associated
with chronic expectations of uncontrollability and resulting feelings of uncertainty.
These negative expectations and feelings are believed to create a need for understanding
and control over one’s social environment. As a result, depressed individuals compared
to nondepressed individuals are more likely to exhibit “a more extensive and intentional
search for and processing of social information in an attempt to regain interpretive and
predictive control” (Yost & Weary, 1996, p.193).
The two different literatures on depressive interpretation seem to be in stark
contrast. On one hand, the studies on the major cognitive theories indicate that depressed
individuals make dysfunctional and maladaptive interpretations because of the tendency
to process information in a selective and negatively biased manner. On the other hand,
there is a body of research that suggests that depressed individuals are more extensive
and less biased compared to nondepressed individuals. It may be possible that the
disparate findings are related to differences in the way depressed individuals process
social versus self-referent information. However, another possibility is the that the two
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literatures are focusing on different stages of processing rather than processing that is
unique to certain types of information (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988).
According to Gilbert and his colleagues, social inferences are a product of two
qualitatively different types of processes. The automatic stages result in biased
judgments, and the effortful stages result in “corrected” judgments. The model was
developed to explain and investigate the correspondence bias in person perception, and
the researchers’ unique contribution to the literature has been the notion that social
inferences can be either relatively biased or relatively unbiased depending on the level of
cognitive resources and motivation that is available for effortful inferential correction.
The model also seems to have profound implications for depression theories and studies.
Perhaps depressive interpretations about the self are more versatile and complex
constructs than currently conceptualized by the major models. Furthermore, the different
findings from the major cognitive theories and the control-motivation model may be due
to investigations of different stages of processing. More specifically, perhaps researchers
of the major cognitive theories are capturing the influences of the biased, automatic
stages whereas the researchers of the control-motivation model are investigating the
influences of the corrective and unbiased stages.
To date, no studies have examined the influences of corrective processing on the
interpretation of depressed individuals about the self. The goal of the presented studies
was to examine the separate and combined influences of both negative biases and
corrective processes on depressives’ self-referent interpretations.
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Chapter II: Review of Literature
Research on Cognitive Processes in Depression
Depression is considered to be the most common psychological disorder in the
world today. Approximately 9.5% of Americans age 18 or older suffers from a
diagnosable depressive disorder (National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH], 2001).
The “epidemic” problem can have devastating effects on all aspects of personal and
social life. On an individual level, depression can interfere with school, work, and
relationships and result in shame, medical problems, divorce, and suicide. On a broader
social level, the disorder has been considered the leading cause of disability (NIMH,
2001). The work force and economy are affected by lower productivity, absenteeism,
and health care expenditures. It is estimated that the costs of depression exceed $30
billion a year in the United States (Rice & Miller, 1995).
Due to the severe and pervasive impact of depression, the disorder has been in the
forefront of psychopathological research. Early investigations of depression were
influenced by psychoanalytic and behavioral approaches. However, in the 1960s, the
cognitive perspective revolutionized the field of psychology and led to cognitive theories
and research paradigms in the literature on emotional disorders. From the cognitive
perspective, human functioning and adaptation depends on the manner in which
information is processed. Therefore, emotional disorders are explained by maladaptive
differences in the selection, transformation, encoding, storing, and retrieval of
information. These fundamental assumptions have had a strong influence on depression
research. The ultimate goal has been to identify the cognitive constructs and mechanisms
that contribute to the onset, maintenance, and treatment of the disorder.
The subdisciplines of clinical and social psychology have made different but
equally important theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding of
information processing in depression. The prominent theories in clinical psychology
have focused on self-referent processing, and the studies on these theories have shown
that depression is associated with negative biases in memory, attention, and
interpretation. Theories from social psychology have focused on depressives’ cognitions
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about others, and research on the control-motivation model in particular has shown that
depressed individuals make social judgments that are relatively unbiased and situation-
appropriate compared to nondepressed individuals. The purpose of this literature review
is to examine these two literatures on depressive interpretation and to integrate these
findings into a more comprehensive conceptualization of the interpretive processing in
depression.
Major Cognitive Theories of Depression
The major cognitive models of depression include Beck’s cognitive theory of
depression (1967, 1976), the hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989),
Seligman’s (1975) learned helplessness theory, and Rehm’s (1977) self-control model.
Although differences do exist between these models, the fundamental assumption is that
depression is characterized by negative thinking (Alloy, Albright, Abramson, & Dykman,
1990). There are two theories in particular that have significantly influenced the current
views of depressive information processing. Accordingly, the following review will
focus on the concepts and findings that have stemmed from these theories.
The “hopelessness theory” (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), which is a
revision of the “learned helplessness” model (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978),
states that hopelessness depression is a subtype of depression with specific causes,
symptoms, and treatments. A significant etiological factor of hopelessness depression is
a chronic expectation that desired events are improbable and adverse events are
inevitable. It is believed that individuals with these expectations develop a tendency to
attribute negative life events to internal, stable, and general factors and positive life
events to external, unstable, and specific factors. Therefore, when negative events occur,
depressed individuals are more likely to make negative inferences about the self and have
overly pessimistic inferences about the consequences of the event. Eventually, the
maladaptive attributional style is believed cause feelings of hopelessness and depressive
symptoms.
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (1967, 1976) is the most widely accepted
and researched theory of the depression. According to Beck, depression is triggered and
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maintained by maladaptive and dysfunctional self-schemata. “Schemas are relatively
enduring internal structures of stored generic or prototypical features of stimuli, ideas, or
experience that are used to organize new information in a meaningful way thereby
determining how phenomena are perceived and conceptualized” (Clark, Beck, & Alford,
1999, p. 79). It is believed that the content of depressives’ schemas are extreme and
negative because of adverse and traumatic childhood experiences, such as loss, parental
criticism, or lack of control. The negative experiences are organized together to form
constellations of negative attitudes and beliefs about the self, the world, and the future.
Depressive schemas act as a vulnerability factor for pessimistic thinking and
negative affect. They can remain dormant, during which information processing is
relatively unaffected by the negative expectations and beliefs. However, the schemas can
be activated by distressing events or schema-relevant information. Once the depressive
schemas are activated, they dominate the processing of incoming information by
influencing the way stimuli and events are perceived, attended to, evaluated, and
remembered. The ultimate outcome of the biased processing is “an automatic tendency
to selectively focus on the negative features of one’s personal experiences and to exclude
or overlook the positive elements of the situation” (Clark, Beck, and Alford, 1999, p.
177). This is referred to as the “selective processing hypothesis” of the cognitive theory
of depression.
Research on Depressive Negativity Hypothesis
The major cognitive theories of depression have led to considerable research
examining the hypothesis that depressive thinking is negatively biased. For example,
researchers have investigated the “diathesis-stress” notion that depressed individuals
think in a negative style and that their cognitive style makes them emotionally vulnerable
to life stressors (Alloy et al., 1999). The studies most relevant to the negativity prediction
use designs with stimuli that is emotionally laden and self-referent. These designs allow
for the triggering and measuring of the negatively biased mechanisms that are predicted
in depression. The supporting research has shown that depressed individuals are
negatively biased in the way they attend to, recall, and interpret information.
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Attention in depression. One successful method for examining negative biases in
attention is to investigate “debilitated task performance” (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999).
These studies have mood-related distracters that are designed to interfere with
performance during an experimental task. The assumption is that concurrent encoding of
mood-congruent distracters will lead to debilitations in task performance. For example,
two studies (Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib & McCann, 1984) presented negative, neutral,
and positive words in different colors. Participants were instructed to name the color of
the words, and the task distracter was the valence of the presented words. Both studies
found longer response times to depression related words in the depressed group compared
to the non-depressed group.
An alternative method for investigating attentional biases is to assess facilitated
cognitive performance. Studies using recognition tasks have found that depressed
individuals recognize unpleasant words faster and more accurately than non-depressed
individuals (e.g., Matthews & Antes, 1992; Powell & Hemsley, 1984; von Hippel,
Hawkins, & Narayan, 1994). Consistent with the “debilitated performance” studies,
these studies show that depressive schemas negatively influence the attentional processes
of depressed individuals.
Memory in depression. Memory bias has been another major focus of research on
depressive information processing. “Many studies, for example, have employed
incidental recall strategies that require the individual to first rate stimuli on some
dimension and then later recall the stimuli” (Ingram, Partridge, Scott, & Bernet, 1994, p.
198). The assumption is that enhanced recall of information is related to the content and
organization of activated schemas. Incoming information is presumed to activate
content-related schemas, and subsequent schema functioning is predicted to facilitate and
bias the encoding of information.
In a widely cited study, Derry and Kuiper (1981) used emotionally valenced
adjectives to investigate the self-referent processes of depressed and non-depressed
individuals. They found that depressed individuals recalled self-referent adjectives more
frequently and more efficiently than non-depressed individuals, which indicates the
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existence of self-schemas in depression. Furthermore, depressed individuals exhibited
significantly enhanced recall for negative adjectives, which supports the hypothesis that
depressive self-schemas contain negative content. Other studies have also found
disproportionately higher recall of negative content compared to positive content in
depressed groups (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992;
Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992).
Interpretive processes in depression. There have been numerous investigations
on memory and attention in depression, and the findings consistently support the
prediction that depressed individuals have negatively biased attention and memory
processes. However, judgments and interpretations are another important aspect of
information processing, and this cognitive dimension has received relatively less
empirical attention in the depression literature (Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996; Nunn,
Mathews, & Trower, 1997). Interpretations are the judgments, inferences, and meanings
that individuals generate when confronted with different types of information and stimuli
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). A major prediction of both the hopelessness theory and
Beck’s theory is that depressed individuals generate negative interpretations about events
and experiences related to the self, and these interpretations result in negative feelings
and the perpetuation of depression (Alloy et al., 1999). The hopelessness model predicts
that those individuals who have a tendency to make negative inferences, either about the
self or about future consequences, after they have experienced a negative life event are
highly susceptible to developing hopelessness depression (Dykman & Abramson, 1990).
Beck’s theory also emphasizes the importance of interpretations. “When a variety of
meanings can be accessed, which one becomes dominant or accessible and which ones
are suppressed can be taken as an indicator of an encoding bias” (Clark, Beck, & Alford,
1999, p.189). Considering the theoretical significance of interpretations, it is surprising
that there has been a dearth of research on depressives’ interpretations of self-referent
information.
Hammen and Krantz’s (1976) study was one of the earliest investigations of
cognitive distortions in depression. Participants were given either positive, negative, or
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no feedback after a performance task, and it was found that depressed individuals’
expectations and evaluations were significantly more influenced by negative feedback
compared to the control group. First, the depressed group receiving negative feedback
was significantly more pessimistic about future performances compared to the
nondepressed group, even though initial predictions about performance in the two groups
were similar. Second, the depressed group receiving negative feedback subsequently
made significantly more negative ratings about themselves compared to the nondepressed
group. These findings show that depressed individuals respond to feedback in a way that
perpetuates negative biases in evaluations about the self. In addition to the feedback task,
the researchers also included an interpretation task. Participants read six brief stories
about hypothetical characters in various problematic situations, and they were instructed
to select the response option that most likely represented the character’s thoughts and
feelings in that situation. It was found that depressed individuals chose significantly
more “pessimistic” and “logically unjustified” responses and significantly less
“nondepressed-nondistorted” responses compared to the nondepressed group.
Several other studies have shown that depressed individuals react differentially to
positive and negative feedback. Swann and his colleagues have shown that, compared to
favorable feedback, depressed individuals prefer unfavorable feedback and perceive the
unfavorable feedback as more credible (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996; Swann,
Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992). It has also been
shown that depressed individuals are more inclined to impose negative interpretations on
ambiguous feedback (Dykman, Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989), perceive mixed
feedback as negative (e.g., Lowenstein & Hokanson, 1986), react less optimistically to
positive feedback (e.g., Nelson & Craighead, 1977), and react more pessimistically to
negative feedback (e.g., Henriques & Leitenberg, 2002) compared to nondepressed
individuals. Similar to perceptions of feedback, depressed individuals’ perceptions of
their own real-life performances are more pessimistic relative to their judgments of
others’ behaviors (e.g., Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984) and compared to objective
ratings (e.g., Cane & Gotlib, 1985). These findings provide strong evidence that
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depressed individuals have a tendency to perceive self-related feedback and performances
in a negative manner.
Studies with other forms of valenced stimuli than feedback have revealed
depression-related differences in interpretive and judgment processes as well. Nunn,
Mathews, and Trower (1997) found that depressed individuals endorsed significantly
more negative responses compared to positive responses as likely reactions of
hypothetical characters in given situations where as nondepressed individuals endorsed
significantly more positive responses compared to negative responses. Depression
studies with the Scrambled Sentences Test (SST; Wenzlaff, 1988, 1993) have shown that
depressed individuals use negative solutions more than non-depressed individuals to
unscramble emotionally-valenced and self-relevant sentences (e.g., Hedlund & Rude,
1995; Rude, Covich, Jarrold, Hedlund, & Zentner, 2001). Similarly, depressed
individuals endorse significantly more negative adjectives when asked to describe the self
than non-depressed individuals (e.g., Rude, Krantz, & Rosenham, 1988).
Research on causal attributions and future expectations has examined depression-
related differences between judgments for negative and positive events. It is typically
found that depressed individuals compared to nondepressed individuals are more likely to
take responsibility for negative events (see review by Miller & Morretti, 1988) and that
depressed individuals expect more negative and fewer positive events and performances
in the future (e.g., Anderson, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; Cane & Gotlib, 1985; Gaschke,
Braveman, & Evans, 1992). For example, Krantz and Gallagher-Thompson (1990) found
that a depressed group made significantly more negative and distorted interpretations
about negative stories than a non-depressed group, but no interpretive differences were
found between the groups for the positive stories. These studies reveal an interpretive
bias in depression that is characterized by generating more negative responses and less
positive responses than nondepressed individuals.
Recently, the investigations on negatively biased information processing have
been extended beyond currently depressed individuals to formerly depressed individuals.
Hedlund and Rude (1995) conducted the first study that showed negatively biased
12
information-processing in individuals with past, but not current, depressed mood. Their
findings indicated that the formerly depressed group, compared to the never depressed
group, made significantly more negative solutions on the SST. They also showed that the
recall of the formerly depressed group was significantly more negative than the never
depressed group following a Stroop task with valenced words. Another study showed
even more compelling evidence for theoretical predictions about cognitive vulnerability
to depression by showing that an overly-negative response style on the SST predicts
subsequent episodes of depression (Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002).
These studies have provided important evidence for the negatively biased cognitive
mechanisms that are predicted in depression.
Overall, these studies show that depressed individuals have a tendency to make
overly negative interpretations, attributions, judgments, and evaluations when processing
information that is emotionally laden and related to the self. These findings provide
strong support for the predictions of the major cognitive theories. Even more
specifically, they support Beck’s notion of selective bias by indicating that depressed
individuals are more likely to impose negative meanings and less likely to impose
positive meanings on self-referent information when there is a range of categorical
meanings.
Social Cognition in Depression
Whereas the research on the major cognitive models primarily examines
depression-related differences in self-referent interpretations, the social-cognitive
researchers focus on depression-related differences in social judgments. Although there
has not been much integration between the two literatures, both emphasize self-
representation as an important cognitive factor. “Theorists long have suggested that an
implicit, if not explicit, comparison of self with others is an integral part of self-
perception, as well as other-perception” (Weary & Edwards, 1993, p. 302). Therefore,
the findings and methodological advances in the social cognition literature have
significant relevance for the understanding of interpretive processes regarding the self in
depression.
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Motivation and Social Cognition
The depression literature on social cognition has historically focused on the
influence of motivation to a greater extent than have the major depression theories. The
development of this focus on motivation can be traced back to the earlier work on
attributions and control motivation (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967).
One of the assumptions of this work was that “attributions were made in order to render
the social world predictable and controllable” (Pittman & Heller, 1987, p. 468).
Supporting studies have shown that individuals are more likely to engage in attributional
analysis when they are deprived of control (e.g. D’Agostino & Pittman, 1982; Pittman &
Pittman, 1980; Swann, Stephenson, & Pittman, 1981), provided with negative or
unexpected information (e.g., Clary & Tesser, 1983; Diener & Dweck, 1978; Hastie,
1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Wong & Weiner, 1981), or feel that the
attributional outcome is personally relevant (e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, &
Dermer, 1976; Elliott, 1979; Harvey, Yarkin, Lightner, & Town, 1980; Jones & Davis,
1965; Monson, Keel, Stephens, & Genung, 1982).
One study (McCaul, 1983) examined the effects of depression on the level of
attributional activity to provide further support for the predictions about control
motivation. It is believed that depression is associated with chronic expectations of
uncontrollability (e.g., Abrasomson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976). Therefore, McCaul
predicted that depressed individuals would make greater use of attributional information
than non-depressed individuals. participants read an essay that supported the presence of
nuclear power plants in heavily populated areas. Half of the participants were told that
the person was paid $2500 to write the essay (external attributional information), and the
other half of the participants were told that the essay was an entry in a personal journal
(internal attributional information). It was found that the depressed group was less likely
to attribute the writing of the essay to internal traits of the person when they were
informed that the person was paid as opposed to writing a journal entry. The
nondepressed group, on the other hand, made similar judgments about the causes of the
essay regardless of the attributional condition. McCaul concluded that the feelings of
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uncontrollability in the depressed group led to a greater use of attributional information,
which resulted in less biased judgments. The findings provided further support that
attributional activity is driven by the need for control.
Model of social-cognitive consequences of depression. Since McCaul’s
investigation, many studies have provided further evidence that depressed individuals
process social information in a more extensive way than do nondepressed individuals
(e.g., Edwards & Weary, 1993; Gleicher & Weary, 1991; Hildebrand-Saints & Weary,
1988; Marsh & Weary, 1989; Weary, Elbin, & Hill, 1987; Weary, Jordan, & Hill, 1985;
Yost & Weary, 1996). Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, and Edwards (1993) developed a model
of mild and moderate depression to provide a framework for understanding these results.
The model also includes the consequences of depressives’ uncontrollability expectations
on social cognition. The main premise of the model was described by Yost and Weary
(1996) as follows:
Mild and moderate perceptions of control loss associated with mild and moderate
depression generate feelings of uncertainty about one’s ability to understand
causal relationships in the social world; these feelings, in turn, are thought to
result in a more extensive and intentional search for and processing of social
information in an attempt to regain interpretive and predictive control (p. 141).
Several other researchers in addition to McCaul, have found that depressed
individuals are more likely to attend to an extensive range of information in their social
environment, take the relevant information into account, and make judgments about
others that are relatively unbiased or appropriate to the situation. Yost and Weary (1996)
used a design similar to McCaul’s study but also placed half of the participants under a
cognitive load (rehearsing a six digit number while reading a speech). They found that
depressed individuals were less biased than nondepressed individuals when there was no
cognitive load. However, no differences were found in the load condition. They
concluded that depressed individuals’ greater use of attributional information to make
unbiased judgments is a motivated and deliberate style of processing because it is
impaired by cognitive limitations, such as insufficient attention.
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Related studies have shown that depressed individuals are more sensitive to
attributional information. For example, Weary, Jordan, and Hill (1985) showed a
videotape of a student that performed poorly on an aptitude test. After the performance,
the student was shown to either accept responsibility for his performance (a behavior that
is in accordance with social norms) or not accept responsibility for his performance (a
social violation). It was found that the depressed group in the social violation condition
made significantly harsher judgments about the student compared to the nondepressed
group in the social violation condition and compared to the depressed group in the no
violation condition. The nondepressed group’s judgments did not vary as a function of
the actor’s willingness to take responsibility. The researchers concluded that the
violation of a typical norm increased feelings of uncertainty in the depressed group,
which in turn increased sensitivity to the available information.
Lassiter, Koenig, & Apple (1996) examined depressives’ sensitivity to
information and processing motivation by asking participants to watch videotapes of
actors performing everyday activities (e.g., cleaning) and then to identify units of
meaningful actions in the performances they observed (e.g., opened the door). The
researchers found that the depressed group had higher rates of unitization than the
nondepressed group if the behavioral sequence had subjective importance or if they were
explicitly instructed to identify “the smallest actions that seem natural and meaningful to
you.” However, the depressed groups had lower rates of unitization than the
nondepressed group if the behavioral sequence lacked subjective importance and explicit
task instructions were not available. The study indicates that depressed individuals are
more sensitive to information and process information more extensively than
nondepressed individuals but only when motivation is sufficient.
Researchers have also found that depressed individuals are more likely to seek
information and to generate more judgments compared to nondepressed individuals when
making social judgments. Gleicher and Weary (1991) found that depressed individuals
listed more impressions about an actor and reported a greater interest in understanding
another person’s behaviors than nondepressed individuals. The depressed group in Flett,
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Pliner, and Blankstein’s study (1989) listed more causes for real life positive and negative
events and had higher scores on the Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher,
Danilovics, Fernandez, Perterson, & Reeder, 1986) than the nondepressed group.
Hildebrand-Saints and Weary (1989) informed participants that they would be playing
the role of an interviewer and instructed them to choose interview questions from a list of
potential questions. The depressed group selected questions that were higher in
diagnosticity (i.e., provided more information about the interviewee) than the
nondepressed group.
In summary, there is a small but growing body of research in the social-cognition
literature that provides compelling evidence that depressed individuals are more likely
than non depressed individuals to attend to an extensive range of information in their
social environment, take the relevant information into account, and make judgments
about others that are relatively unbiased or appropriate to the situation. Although the
model and the supporting findings have not yet been discussed in the context of self-
referent processing, there seems to be a contradiction between this perspective and the
major cognitive theories. The social-cognitive consequences model of depression model
suggests that, at least in some situations, depressed individuals are more data-driven than
are nondepressed individuals, and the supporting studies have provided compelling
evidence that depressed individuals process available information in an extensive rather
than selective way and make judgments that are relatively unbiased and situation-
appropriate rather than biased.
Integrating the Different Perspectives and Findings
Understanding the true manner in which depressed individuals interpret and judge
the world around them is important to the progress of theories, research, and treatments in
the field of depression. Most of the knowledge about depressive inferential processes has
been influenced and advanced by studies on the major cognitive theories. It is common
for these examinations to focus on the judgments that depressed individuals make about
the self, as opposed to about others or general knowledge. The theoretical reason is that
the core of the maladaptive thoughts and processes in depression is predicted to be “the
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self.” For example, Clark, Beck, and Alford (1999) contend that “core schema are
usually expressed in terms of absolute statements and generally refer to attributes about
the self” (p. 83). Studies with self-referent stimuli have validated these theoretical
conceptions of depressive inference by showing that depressed groups are more negative
and pessimistic than nondepressed groups.
Social cognition research has also contributed to the current knowledge about
inferential processing in depression. The basic difference in these studies is that social
judgments, not judgments about the self, are investigated. Researchers have frequently
commented that depression studies on social cognition do not consistently reveal negative
patterns (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988). Furthermore, there is evidence that depressed
individuals are capable of and more likely to process social information in relatively
accurate or even-handed ways, compared to nondepressed individuals. In particular, the
previously described research on social cognition and control-motivation has found that
depressed individuals process social information in an extensive and relatively unbiased
manner.
Although the social-cognitive literature examines judgments about others, it still
seems relevant to understanding the way that depressed individuals make sense of the
self. Gara et al. (1993) described the connection as follows:
What is known about depressed person’ cognitions about persons other than
themselves? An answer to this question seems basic to the understanding of
depressive phenomenology if schemata of self and of other people are assumed to
be inextricably and dialectically interrelated-that is, if a person’s self-
understanding is assumed to occur within a relationship framework that
necessarily involves his or her views of others (p. 93).
The implicit connection between self and other-perception has been noted by several
other researchers as well (e.g., Weary & Edwards, 1993). However, there has been a lack
of integration between the two bodies of research. An important question for future
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research is whether these extensive and deliberate tendencies that influence depressed
individuals’ social inferences can also influence their self-inferences.
An obvious explanation for the disparate findings is that depressed individuals
process social information differently than self-referent information. However, there
seem to be other methodological differences between these areas of research that may
also provide an explanation for the different findings. It will be postulated that the two
literatures are focusing on different stages of information processing rather than entirely
different tendencies that are exclusive to certain types of information. More specifically,
it will be argued that the research on the major cognitive theories focuses on the
automatic stages of processing while the research on the control-motivation model
focuses on effortful stages of processing.
Stage Model of Social Inferences
The distinction between automatic and effortful processing initially appeared in
the cognitive science literature (e.g., Posner, 1978; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
According to these researchers, automatic processes are “initiated without awareness and
place limited demands on available cognitive capacity” (Ingram, Partridge, Scott, &
Bernet, 1994, p. 198). Conversely, effortful processing “requires conscious activity and
is presumably under the control of the individual” (Ingram, Partridge, Scott, & Bernet,
1994, pg. 198). These concepts have contributed significantly to research on attributions
and social-cognitions in the general population. Earlier studies indicated that individuals
make dispositional judgments about others that are automatic and biased. “Recent
research suggests that it is useful to think of social inference not as a single process but as
a series of processes” (Krull, 1993, p. 340). In other words, social inferences are the
outcome of automatic and effortful processes.
Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988) have developed a stage model of social
inferences to explain the cognitive mechanisms underlying the correspondence bias. The
model predicts that inferences are influenced by two qualitatively different stages.
During the initial stages, the perceiver makes an observation and then makes a judgment
about the observation related to a specific inferential goal. The inferential goal is either
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to make a judgment about a person or about a situation. For example, if someone is
yelling, the observer may either make judgments about the person’s character (hostile) or
the person’s situation (stressful). These initial judgments are believed to be automatic,
spontaneous, and efficient because they are influenced by prior beliefs and expectations,
such as schemas and stereotypes (Krull, 1993).
The researchers contend that the automatic stages of processing will be followed
by an effortful stage if the attention of the perceiver is not limited and if the perceiver is
sufficiently motivated. In the effortful stage, it is believed that the perceiver will
“correct” the initial judgment based on a deliberate and controlled consideration of
available information that may override or mitigate the biased judgment. “Correction
seems to be a much more willful process that is easily impaired by ongoing cognitive
activities” (Krull, 1993, p. 341). Here is an example of the automatic and effortful stages
that are involved in the social inferential process:
When perceivers view behavior, they begin by identifying the behavior (‘Tom is
giving money to the United Way representative’), next they characterize the actor,
or infer that the actor possesses a disposition that corresponds to the actor’s
behavior (‘Tom is a generous person’), and finally, they correct this inference by
taking into account the circumstances or situations that may have constrained the
actor’s behavior (‘Tom knows that Marlene likes charitable men. Perhaps Tom
isn’t a particularly generous person after all’) p. 340.
To examine these predictions, Gilbert and his colleagues have developed a
variation of the correspondence bias paradigm. As in the previously discussed studies,
the participants observe or read descriptions of a particular person or situation, and then
they are provided with information that is intended to correct biases in judgments. The
bias-reducing information has been referred to in several different ways by the
researchers in the literature (e.g., “constraining,” “situational,” “additional,” and
“available” information). In this review, the general term “corrective information” will
be used. The unique aspect of Gilbert and his colleagues’ studies is that half of the
participants are placed under a cognitive load (e.g., rehearsing a phrase or a six digit
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number). The assumption is that the condition with the cognitive load will reveal the
efficient and automatic effects of the initial stages of processing, and the condition
without the cognitive load will reveal the effortful and corrective effects of the latter
stages of processing. The studies provide strong and consistent evidence that relatively
automatic judgments are biased due to the internal beliefs and constructs, such as
stereotypes and schemas, while relatively effortful judgments are less biased and more
accurate due to the conscious and deliberate use of external information (e.g., Gilbert,
Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Krull, 1993; Krull & Erickson, 1995).
Applying the Model to Current Depression Research
Research on the major cognitive theories has predominantly been focused on
automatic processing. Many of the methodologies in these studies are “…derived from
research in experimental cognitive psychology, to assess automatic cognitive processes
and schematic functioning in depressed persons” (Gotlib & Krasnoperova, 1998, p. 606).
For example, a technique for investigating schema-driven interpretations is to present
valenced stimuli (e.g., negative versus positive feedback) and to ask participants to make
judgments, evaluations, and interpretations about the stimuli. It is expected that the
negative information will activate depressive schemas and maladaptive beliefs, which
will in turn lead to overly negative and typically automatic responses. These methods
have contributed significantly to understanding the way depressed individuals
automatically interpret self-referent information.
These studies are usually not focused on motivational factors or other effortful
processes that may influence self-judgment (Dykman, 1998). Most of the studies use
tasks that require participants to choose from negative and positive response options.
Although the studies do show that depressed individuals consistently choose the negative
options, they do not show whether depressed individuals would still rely on schematic
biases and dysfunctional attitudes if alternative, corrective information were available.
Therefore, the studies lack methodologies that are appropriate for assessing correction of
overly negative judgments about the self.
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The studies on the social-cognitive theories intend to assess motivated reasoning.
To achieve this goal, the experimental tasks are designed to create social situations with
more than one reasonable interpretation. Typically, participants are required to make
social judgments about either real or hypothetical characters in one of two conditions. In
one condition, participants are given specific information about the character that is
designed to significantly alter participants’ social judgment process. This type of
information is commonly referred to as situational constraints or dispositional
information. Researchers believe that, when this type of information is made available,
then effortful correction processes can be examined because participants have a means
for adjusting their biased social judgments. Researchers contend that, on the other hand,
the social judgments made in the other experimental conditions without such information
will more directly reveal the influences of cognitive biases. Such designs can be useful to
studies on self-referent processing by allowing for the observation and assessment of
secondary, corrective processes that may also influence depressives’ self-judgments, in
addition to negative biases.
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Chapter III: Overview of Presented Studies
Existing studies on self-referent inferences in depression are designed to elicit and
assess cognitive biases. To date, no studies have examined whether depressed
individuals can utilize corrective information to reduce negativity in self-referent
judgments. The purpose of the proposed studies was to develop a paradigm that allows
for the observation of both negative biases and corrective processes during the
interpretation of self-referent information in depression. The term corrective information
was developed, for the purposes of the presented studies, to refer to information that may
significantly alter one’s judgment about the self. It was operationally defined as
information that indicates a plausible factor, other than self, that may have played a role
in the negative outcome of an event. For example, students commonly make negative
inferences about their intellectual abilities after receiving a poor grade on an exam.
However, information about the difficulty of the test may alter these judgments. If a
student realizes that the exam was extremely difficult, then s/he can “correct” overly
negative inferences about their intellectual abilities by accounting for the impact of test
difficulty on their academic performance.





















“I’m not a great student,
but I could do better if
the test wasn’t so hard.”
No inferential change
or continued poor
judgment about the self
(e.g., “I’m never going to
be good at school.”)
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Study 1
The primary purpose of the first study was to test if depressed individuals can
utilize corrective information to reduce negativity in self-referent judgments. Inferential
certainty and memory were also investigated to provide support for the cognitive
processes that were predicted to influence the self-referent judgments of the mood
groups. The design included depressed and nondepressed college students. The
participants were required to imagine themselves in hypothetical scenarios about
everyday situations with negative outcomes. Corrective information was included in half
of the scenarios. After the scenarios were presented, participants were asked to make
evaluative judgments about themselves based on the outcome of the scenario. They
were also asked to rate their certainty about their self-evaluation and to recall information
from the scenarios.
Hypothesis 1
Depressed individuals will make more negative judgments about themselves, and
will recall more negative information from the vignettes compared to the non-depressed
individuals. This prediction is based on the theoretical assumption of the major cognitive
theories that the interpretation of self-referent information in depression is influenced by
maladaptive and pessimistic cognitive biases.
Hypothesis 2
The depressed group will show a greater reduction in self-referent negativity and
greater uncertainty in the corrective versus the non corrective condition than will the non
depressed group. Depressed participants are also expected to show better recall of
corrective information than are non depressed participants. These predictions are based
on the past research on the control-motivation model of depression showing that
depressed individuals are more sensitive to and more likely to use available attributional




The primary purpose of the second study was to extend the first investigation by
examining whether depressed individuals would correct negative self-inferences in
simulated real-life contexts, rather than hypothetical situations. Depressed and
nondepressed participants were asked to give a speech while ostensibly being observed
by a professor. Half of the participants were given information before the speech task
that was designed to indicate that the rater’s mood was disagreeable. Following the
speech tasks, participants were asked to evaluate themselves on several speech-related
dimensions. Then they were provided with feedback from the professor on their speech
performance, which was relatively negative. The participants were subsequently asked to
make predictions about their performance on a second speech.
Hypothesis 1
The depressed group will show a smaller increase in expectations for their
performance on the second speech than will the non depressed group.
Hypothesis 2
The depressed compared to the nondepressed group’s positive expectations about
their second speech performance will be enhanced by the corrective information to a
greater degree.
Hypothesis 3
The depressed group’s estimation of the validity of the speech feedback will be
influenced by the corrective information to a greater degree than will be the case for the
non depressed group.
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The study employed a 2 (mood group: non-depressed, depressed) X 2
(information condition: corrective information, irrelevant information) X 2 (order of
information condition: corrective or irrelevant vignettes first) mixed ANOVA design,
with mood group as the between group variable and information condition as the within-
subjects variable.
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students from the Educational Psychology
subject pool at the University of Texas at Austin and received course credit for
participation. They were instructed by the department to sign up for the “Story Time”
study. This title was developed to avoid indication of the actual purposes of the study.
One student was excluded from the study due to arriving late for the session.
The final sample consisted of 46 undergraduate student participants. The mean
age of participants was 21.35 (SD = 1.98). The ethnicity breakdown of the sample was
56.5% Caucasian (26 participants), 21.7% Asian-American (10 participants), 8.7%
Latino/Hispanic (4 participants), 4.3% Indian-American (2 participants), 4.3% Biracial (2
participants), and 4.3% Other (2 participants). The study consisted of 29 (23 females and
6 males) non-depressed participants and 17 (14 females and 3 males) depressed
participants. The mean BDI scores were 5.90 (SD = 3.098) for the non-depressed group
and 18.75 (SD = 7.707) for the depressed group.
Participants were divided into mood groups by their total score on the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). It was
originally proposed that participants who scored 10 or above would be included in the
depressed mood group and those who scored 5 or below would be included in the non-
depressed mood group. A BDI cut-off score of 12 was chosen instead because it allowed
for a compromise between the goal of using the most stringent possible criterion for
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defining the depressed group and the goal of retaining sufficient numbers of participants
in this group for reasonable statistical power.
Measures
Development of vignettes. Four vignettes were developed as the emotional stimuli
in the study. The purpose of these vignettes was to allow for the assessment of
participants’ negative, self-relevant cognitions and for the influence of corrective
processes on these cognitions. The vignettes were approximately 10-14 sentences in
length, described typical college situations with negative outcomes, and were written in
the second person (e.g. “you take an exam in class today”). The four vignette scenarios
were as follows: getting a low grade on a mid-term exam, being excluded from a party
invitation, receiving a poor evaluation from an employer, and getting ignored at a social
function.
Two versions were created for each vignette, a corrective version and an
irrelevant version. The only difference between the two versions of the vignettes was a
single phrase. For the corrective version, the phrase was designed to provide information
that facilitated the correction of negative self-judgments about the emotional event. In
other words, the phrase indicated a plausible explanation for the negative emotional
outcome that was not related to the self. The irrelevant vignettes phrases provided
information that was not related to the negative outcome of the emotional event. The
following is an example of a vignette, with both phrases included:
When you get to your class, you notice that the grades for the mid-term exam
have been posted. There is a huddle of people around the bulletin board
discussing the exam and trying to find their grades. Quite a few students were
looking through their lecture notes (irrelevant version of phrase) / are talking
about how tricky the exam was (corrective version of phrase). As you work
your way to the front, someone taps you on the shoulder. It’s an old friend from
high school, and you are both surprised that you had never seen each other in the
class until now. Before you get a chance to catch up with each other, the
professor walks in and begins the class. You can’t wait any longer to see your
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grade so you decide to take a quick peek. You are surprised to see that your grade
is low.
To measure participants’ interpretations of these vignettes, an interpretive statement was
developed for each vignette and was followed by a agreement rating scale. These
interpretative statements were designed to reflect a negative meaning about the self,
based on the vignette scenarios. For example, for the vignette above participants were
asked to rate the statement “The low grade means you are a poor student” from a scale of
1 (strongly agree) to 9 (strongly disagree).
Piloting of vignettes. A small pilot study was conducted to provide data about the
validity of the vignettes. 29 undergraduate students from an undergraduate educational
psychology course read each version of the vignettes and completed ratings scales about
the vignettes for course credit. A booklet (Appendix A) containing the vignettes and
rating scales was given to the participants. Students were asked to first review the
irrelevant version of a vignette and then to review the corrective version of the vignette.
After reviewing both versions of a vignette, they were presented with the negative
interpretation (e.g., “the low exam grade means you are a poor student”) statement for
that vignette and were asked to rate their agreement with it on a scale of 1 (strongly
agree) to 9 (strongly disagree). These ratings were used to assess participants’
interpretations of the emotional event in the vignette. In addition, the student research
participants were instructed to explain any differences in how they interpreted the two
versions. Lastly, they were instructed to rate the realism of the first and second version
of each vignette from a scale of 1 (very realistic) to 9 (very unrealistic).
The pilot data were analyzed to determine if the irrelevant and corrective versions
of the four vignettes differed in the expected ways. Paired-samples t-tests supported the
effectiveness of the information condition manipulation by indicating that participants’
interpretations of all four vignettes were more negative for the irrelevant version
compared to the corrective versions. Table 1 contains the means, standard deviations,
and t-tests. Participants’ narrative data provided further support that the versions differed
in the expected ways. The data indicated that participants considered the corrective
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information when making inferences about the vignettes and made less negative self-
judgments based on this information, as seen by the examples provided in Table 2.
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and T-tests for Inference Ratings from Vignette
Pilot Study
Vignette With irrelevant With corrective
target phrase target phrase Paired-samples t-test
Mid-term exam 5.72 (1.96) 6.69 (1.49) t(28)= -3.47, p=.002
Party invitation 4.48 (2.20) 5.66 (2.26) t(28)= -2.84, p=.008
Boss evaluation 3.55 (1.24) 5.03 (1.68) t(28)= 4.58, p=.000
Club meeting 3.76 (1.50) 4.83 (1.71) t(28)= -3.50, p=.002
Note: Higher ratings are more positive.
Participants’ ratings of the realism of the vignettes were examined to determine if
the emotional stimuli in the study were reflective of real-life, personal situations.
Realistic ratings below 5.0 (neutral) were viewed as indicating that the vignettes were
considered realistic. Table 3 reflects the means and standard deviations of participants’
realistic rating for each vignette, in both versions. Mean realism ratings for all vignettes,
in both versions, were below 5 (considered realistic).
Presentation of the study vignettes. A questionnaire was developed with these
vignette narratives and ratings scales (see Appendix B and C). The vignettes were
presented with the following titles and ordering: “You see your mid-term grade” story,
“you go to a coffee shop” story, “Your boss reviews your project” story, and “You join
an organization” story. The instructions asked participants to “read each of these stories,
and imagine yourself in the situations that you are reading about.”
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Table 2. Examples of Reasons for Rating Irrelevant and Corrective Versions of a
Vignette Scenario Differently
Vignette Scenario Participant Response
Mid-term exam “In the first situation no indication is given that the test was
difficult. Therefore, the student doing poorly is a result of their
ability. However, in the second situation it is indicated that the
test was indeed tricky. Therefore, the student doing poorly is
more a reflection of the test than ability.”
“Knowing that others found the test difficult makes me feel
better even if I did receive a low grade.”
Party invitation “I told the roommate not to talk to me in the second situation,
so I wouldn’t feel as bad if the roommate hadn’t included me in
the conversation.”
“If the roommate had wanted to invite me in the first scenario
she would have told both of us about the party at the same time.
In the second scenario, it could be that the roommate will tell
me when I finish studying.”
Boss evaluation “The fight with his wife my have influenced his mood
negatively, therefore he may have been too quick to judge the
project.”
“If the boss had a lot of troubles on his mind he is more likely
to project those problems onto my report.”
Club meeting “In the first situation the people seem cold and uninterested in
the new member. However, in the second situation, focus is
placed upon the strong work ethic of the group. Thus, rather
than partying they would probably prefer to go home and study.
There is no evidence that they dislike the person.”
“The first group [involved in student issues] is more likely to
want to go out and so it would seem more of a rejection.
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations for Realistic Ratings of Each Vignette (from
Vignette Pilot Study)
Vignette With irrelevant With corrective
target phrase target phrase
Mid-term exam 3.90 (2.11) 2.79 (1.90)
Party invitation 4.34 (2.07) 3.97 (1.90)
Boss evaluation 3.86 (1.25) 4.14 (1.51)
Club meeting 4.55 (1.92) 4.45 (1.82)
For half of the participants, the mid-term and coffee shop vignette were presented
in the irrelevant version and the boss review and organization vignette were presented in
the corrective version (see Appendix B). For the other half of the participants, the order
of the information condition was reversed (see Appendix C). Therefore, while all of the
participants received the vignettes in the same order, half of them received the corrective
condition first and the other half received it second. In addition, all vignettes were
rotated through both the corrective and irrelevant information conditions.
Uncertainty ratings. Each vignette was followed by the same negative
interpretations of the vignette events that were used in the pilot study, and the participants
were instructed to rate this on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 9 (strongly disagree).
These ratings were used to assess participants’ interpretations of the emotional event in
the vignette. The interpretation rating was followed by a confidence rating. Participants
were instructed to rate on a scale of 1 (very certain) to 9 (very uncertain) how certain they
were about their interpretation. This score was used as a measure of how uncertain
participants were about their self-referent interpretations of the negative vignette events.
Memory scores. The memory questionnaire for this study was developed to
measure participants’ recall of the manipulated information in the vignette, whether
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irrelevant or corrective (Appendix D). Memory was of interest because it was expected
to reflect the degree of attention that participants showed to the corrective information.
The form instructed participants to “write as much as you can remember and as close to
verbatim as possible” from the second and third vignettes that they read.” Only two
vignettes were included in the interest of time. The second and third vignettes were
chosen because these would include one irrelevant vignette and one corrective vignette,
regardless of participants’ experimental conditions, while reducing the influence of the
primacy and recency effect on participant memory. The memory questionnaire was
scored by the author based on the extent to which participants’ recalled the content of the
target phrases. Responses received a score of “1” if the corrective or irrelevant concepts
were recalled and “0” if inaccurate or no information was recalled.
A subset of the participants’ memory questionnaires was also scored
independently by a rater who was blind. 10 of these questionnaires were randomly
selected from the order condition that received the corrective version of the coffee shop
vignette and the irrelevant version of the boss review vignette. Another 10 questionnaires
were randomly selected from the other order condition, meaning that the vignette
versions were reversed. The second rater’s memory scores provided inter-ratings for the
following: 5 memory scores for the corrective version of the coffee shop vignette, 5 for
the irrelevant version of the coffee shop vignette, 5 for the corrective version of the boss
review vignette, and 5 for the irrelevant version of the boss review vignette. Inter-rater
reliability of the memory scores ranged from .80 to 1.00.
Beck Depression Inventory. (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh,
1961). The BDI (see Appendix E) is a 21 item self-report inventory that measures the
severity of depression during the past two weeks. The question that assessed suicidality
was omitted. Each item represents a depression-related attitude or symptom. These
items are rated on a scale of 0 (absence of symptom) to 3 (high level of symptom).
Studies have shown that the measure has high internal consistency, concurrent validity,
and construct validity. Although the findings will be discussed in terms of depression, it
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is acknowledged that the selection criteria that will be implemented in this study are more
appropriate for dysphoric mood rather than syndromal depression.
Procedures
Approval from the Internal Review Board of the University of Texas at Austin
was obtained for the procedures for the present study. The experimenter was the
principal investigator of the study. Sessions typically included 5-15 participants and
were conducted in classrooms of similar size and appearance. Each session began by
providing participants with written information about the study procedures, purpose, and
possible effects (Appendix F). Experimenter did not proceed to the experimental phase
until all participants read and signed the consent form and were offered an opportunity to
ask questions. No participant declined participation.
After consent forms were collected, the experimenter gave each participant three
packets. The packets were sealed and numbered 1 through 3. The three packets
contained the vignette booklet, the BDI, and the Memory Questionnaire, respectively.
All participants were instructed at the same time to open the first packet. The
experimenter read the instructions aloud to the participants. After answering participants’
questions, the experimenter instructed participants to complete the contents of each
packet, to reseal the content before opening the next packet, and to not change the content
once a packet was resealed.
Participants were further instructed to return their packets to the experimenter
once completed. They were informed that they would be given a participation receipt
and a debriefing form. The experimenter encouraged the participants to read the
debriefing form (Appendix G) for further information about the importance of their
participation and the purpose of the study. They were also encouraged to talk with the
experimenter or to use the contact information provided in the debriefing form for any
questions or concerns. Participants were requested to dispose of the debriefing form after
reading the information and to withhold from sharing information about the study until
the end of the semester.
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Results
This study used a 2 (mood group: depressed, non-depressed) x 2 (information
condition: irrelevant target phrases and corrective target phrases) x 2 (order of
information condition: corrective or irrelevant vignettes first) design. The between-
subjects factor was mood group, and the within-subjects factor was information
condition. Each participant, whether depressed or non-depressed, was asked to read two
vignettes that included an irrelevant target phrase and two vignettes that included a
corrective target phrase.
Preliminary Analyses
Dependent variables. Following each of the four vignettes, participants rated
their agreement with a negative, self-relevant statement interpretation of the preceding
vignette on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 9 (strongly disagree) and then to rate their
certainty about this interpretation on a scale of 1 (very certain) to 9 (very uncertain).
The two inference ratings that corresponded with the “irrelevant vignettes” (those
that included an irrelevant target phrase) were summed together to create a score for the
irrelevant information condition (“total irrelevant inference score”). Similarly, the two
inference ratings for the vignettes that included a corrective target phrase were summed
together to create a Total Inference Score for the corrective information condition. Higher
scores indicated more disagreement with the negative vignette interpretation and were
interpreted as more correction of a negative cognition about the self.
The data for participants’ certainty about their vignette interpretations was
calculated similarly. Participants’ certainty ratings for their interpretation of the two
vignettes with the irrelevant target phrases were summed together to create a Total
Certainty Score for the irrelevant information condition. This score was used as a
measure of inferential certainty in situations without corrective information. Their
certainty ratings for their interpretation of the two vignettes with the corrective target
phrases were summed together to create a Total Certainty Score for the corrective
information condition. This score was used as a measure of inferential certainty in
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situations with corrective information available. Higher scores indicated more
uncertainty.
The third dependent variable in this study was participants’ memory scores.
Participants were asked to provide verbatim recall of one of the vignettes that included an
irrelevant target phrase and one of the vignettes that included a corrective target phrase.
For each vignette recall, participants received a score of 1 if they recalled the irrelevant or
corrective phrase and 0 if they did not. Higher Memory Score indicated more accurate
recall.
Means and standard deviations for the three dependent variables, as a function of
mood group and information condition, are presented in Table 4.







































Note: Higher inference scores are more positive. Higher uncertainty scores represent
more uncertainty. Higher memory scores represent more recall.
Manipulation check. Another method for evaluating the effectiveness of the
vignette manipulation, in addition to the pilot study, was to analyze the certainty scores
from the main study. If the corrective target phrase was designed as expected, then
vignettes with corrective information would trigger extensive and effortful processing
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and would, therefore, be associated with less inferential certainty and higher information
recall. A paired-samples t-test indicated that inferential uncertainty differed in the
expected ways between the two information conditions. Participants were more uncertain
of their vignette interpretations in the corrective condition (M=6.73, SD=3.24) than they
were in the irrelevant condition (M=5.67, SD=2.60), t(44)= -2.45, p=.018.
Examination of Hypotheses
Hypotheses about self-relevant inferences. a) Overall depressed individuals in
emotional situations will make more negative judgments about the self than non-
depressed individuals. b) Depressed individuals will make significantly less negative
judgments about themselves in emotional situations with corrective information
compared to without corrective information. Non-depressed individuals, on the other
hand, will make similar judgments about themselves in emotional situations with and
without corrective information.
A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
to test predictions about the impact of depression and corrective information on
participants’ self-relevant interpretations, as measured by Total Inference Score. The
within subjects factor was information condition (corrected, uncorrected), and the
between factors were mood group (depressed, non-depressed) and order of information
condition (first two vignettes presented with corrective information versus last two
vignettes presented with corrective information).
There was a significant main effect for mood group, F(1, 41)=8.44, p=.006. As
expected, non-depressed individuals made more positive interpretations (M = 9.66) than
depressed individuals (M = 7.63), regardless of the vignette version. The main effect for
information condition was also significant, F(1, 41)=4.99, p=.03. As expected,
participants’ interpretations of the self were more positive when corrective information
was made available (M = 9.19) compared to the condition without it (M = 8.10). The
main effect for order was not significant.
The analysis also yielded the predicted interaction, F(1, 43)=8.25, p=.006,
indicating that the corrective information had different impacts for the depressed versus
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the non-depressed groups. Pairwise comparisons revealed that depressed individuals
made significantly more positive emotional inferences about vignettes with corrective
information compared to vignettes with irrelevant information (p=.001) where as non-
depressed individuals’ inferences did not significantly differ between the two information
conditions.
The interaction effect between information condition and order was also
significant [F(1, 41)=21.14, p=.001. When making inferences about vignettes with
irrelevant information, participants were more positive if the irrelevant inferences were
presented first compared to when the corrective vignettes were presented first. When
making inferences about corrective vignettes, participants were more positive when the
corrective vignettes were presented first compared to when the irrelevant vignettes were
presented first.
Hypotheses about inferential uncertainty. a) Overall, depressed individuals will
be less certain about their self-relevant interpretations in emotional situations than non-
depressed individuals. b) Depressed individuals’ uncertainty about their self-relevant
interpretations will increase more than non-depressed individuals’ uncertainty in
emotional situations with corrective information.
The analysis of uncertainty ratings was parallel to that done on self-relevant
inference ratings: A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted to test predictions about the impact of depression, corrective information, and
order on participants’ inferential certainty, as measured by Total Certainty Score.
Depressed and non-depressed participants rated their degree of certainty for their two
vignette interpretations in the irrelevant condition and their two vignette interpretations in
the corrective condition. Inferential uncertainty did depend significantly on participants’
information condition, F(1, 41)=6.19, p=.017. Participants in the corrective condition
were more uncertain about their interpretations than participants in the irrelevant version.
The analysis did not yield a significant main effect for mood group and order. It also did
not reveal any significant interaction effects.
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Hypotheses about memory recall. Depressed individuals will recall greatly more
information from the corrective target phrases compared to the irrelevant target phrases.
On the other hand, non-depressed individuals will recall similar amounts of information
from corrective and irrelevant target phrases.
A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on the Memory Scores, with information condition as the within variable and mood group
and order as the between subjects variables. The main effect for information condition
was nearly significant, F(1, 42)=.4.04, p=.051], reflecting that participants recalled
corrective target phrases (X=.90, SD=.04) more than irrelevant target phrases (X=.73,
SD=.07). No other main or interaction effects were significant.
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Experiment 2: Correction of Depressed Individuals’ Negative Self-Judgments
in Real Life Situation
Method
Design
This is a 2 (mood group: depressed, non-depressed) x 2 (information condition:
corrective information, no corrective information) between-subjects design.
Participants
A total of 164 undergraduate students participated in the study. There were 129
participants in the non-depressed group (M=4.74, SD=3.15) and 35 participants in the
depressed group (M=17.97, SD=5.06). Data were collected from 113 of these
participants in the spring semester of 2004. These participants were undergraduate
students from the Educational Psychology subject pool at the University of Texas at
Austin who volunteered for partial fulfillment of course requirements. The remaining 51
participants were recruited from a departmental introductory course in the summer of
2004. The professor offered these students credit on a course assignment for
volunteering in the study. Due to time restrictions on the length of the experimental
sessions demographic data was not collected on either of the participant groups. The
validity measures described below were also not collected on the second group of
participants to increase participation incentive by reducing the amount of time required
by the study.
Procedure
All participants completed the study in fifteen minute individual sessions. The
sessions were conducted in a small room with a one-way mirror, a table, and two chairs.
The participants were greeted by the experimenter upon arrival and taken to the study
room. Participants were instructed to take a seat with their side to the one-way mirror.
Corrective information manipulation. Corrective information was provided in
half of the study cases immediately after participants entered the study room. The
experimenter began these sessions with the following statement: “Dr. Mason, who is
going to be part of our session, is running a little late. Her car got towed so she has to
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walk all the way across campus to get here. But by the time I finish explaining the study
to you, she should be here.” Later in the study, participants would receive unfavorable
feedback from Dr. Mason. The false information about her tardiness was designed to
indicate that Dr. Mason had been involved in an adverse situation prior to the session. It
was considered corrective information because participants in this condition could
potentially attribute the negative feedback from Dr. Mason to an external, situational
factor rather than self-related factors.
Introduction and consent. Following the information about Dr. Mason’s
tardiness, all participants received the same standard introduction. Once participants
were seated, the experimenter gave a standardized introduction:
What we are looking at in this study is speeches-what makes a speech effective
versus ineffective. We are going to ask you to give a two minute speech about the
techniques & strategies that you found helpful when you were trying to apply to
college. While you give the speech, Dr. Mason, who is the faculty sponsor of the
study, will be observing you through this one-way mirror. While she is observing
you, she will be rating the content and the presentation of your speech. Once you
are done with the speech, we are going to ask you to rate yourself and to rate
some feedback that we are going to give you. Then you’re going to complete one
more questionnaire, and you’ll be done with the study. There are more details on
the study in this consent form. Give it a read and then I will be more than happy
to answer any questions you might have either about what you read or what I
said.”
In reality, the speeches were not observed by anyone. The deception was necessary to
create a realistic, emotional situation. At the end of the introduction, participants were
given time to ask questions and to review the consent form. Once consent was provided,
the experimenter exited the room in order for the participant to complete the speech task.
Self-evaluation of speech performance. After two minutes, the experimenter
returned to the room and gave the participants a speech evaluation form (Appendix H).
The experimenter explained the form to the participants as follows:
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This is a form that is designed for evaluating speeches. It’s usually used in a
professional context so some of the terms might seem a bit unfamiliar. If you are
not sure what they are asking, don’t worry about it. Just try your best. Basically
we’re just asking you to evaluate yourself on the speech you just gave.
The form was developed for the purposes of this study. It consisted of eight dimensions
of speech that were invented so as to give the appearance of a published measure. Of
these dimensions, four referred to the “content of speech” (e.g., cohesion of distinct
points) and four referred to the “presentation of speech” (e.g., congruence of facial
expression with content). Participants were required to rate their speech on these
dimensions using a scale ranging from (1) poor to (10) excellent.
The form was used to assess the negativity of participants’ inferences about their
speech abilities. Overall score was calculated by summing the ratings of each speech
dimension with lower scores reflecting a strong negative bias about their overall speech
abilities. Scale scores were calculated by summing the ratings of each dimension for the
respective subscales. Lower scores reflected a strong negative bias about ability to
develop speeches and to present speeches respectively.
Evaluation of other’s feedback. After evaluating their own speech, participants
were given the opportunity to review Dr. Mason’s feedback about their speech. The
experimenter gave the participants a sealed folder with the ostensible feedback. The
format of Dr. Mason’s feedback was identical to the participants’ self-evaluation speech
form. Dr. Mason’s name was handwritten on the top of the form as the “rater”, and the
scores were handwritten for each speech dimension (Appendix I). Dr. Mason’s ratings
for speech content were below average, and her scores for speech performance were even
lower. Each participant received the same feedback sheet. The experimenter waited
outside of the study room while the participants reviewed it. Participants were instructed
to reseal it and call in the experimenter when they were through.
When the experimenter returned, the participants were instructed to provide their
reactions about the feedback:
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As part of the speech feedback process, we would like to ask you to give your
reactions and thoughts to the feedback you just received. It is very important for
the study to be honest on the following questionnaire. We realize that it might be
difficult to react to someone else’s feedback but this will really help us understand
the speech giving process. Rest assured that your answers will be anonymous and
that Dr. Mason will not see them.
These assurances were provided in order to allow for a more honest and accurate
reactions to the feedback.
A form (Appendix J) was developed for the purposes of this study to assess
participants’ interpretations of Dr. Mason’s feedback. Participants were instructed to rate
how accurate they considered the speech feedback they received from Dr. Mason. They
were asked to separately rate her overall content ratings and her presentation ratings on a
scale of 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate). They were also instructed to rate how
valid the overall ratings were on a scale of 1 (not very valid) to 7 (very valid) and how
credible the overall ratings were on a scale of 1 (not very credible) to 7 (very credible).
Self-evaluation of predicted speech performance. Following the feedback review,
participants were instructed to complete another self-evaluation task.
We are thinking about adding a second speech to the study. So hypothetically
what would have happened is that you would have given a second speech right
after the first, on a new topic and a new rater would have rated you. For us to
know if we should add a second speech to the study we would like you to fill out
this form based on how you think you would have done if you had given a second
speech.
Participants were given a blank speech self-evaluation form. This procedure was
designed to obtain a measure of participants’ judgments about their speech abilities, after
receiving negative feedback.
Cognitive measure. Once the speech evaluation tasks were completed, the
participants were asked to complete the Beck Depression Inventory. The experimenter
explained the instructions for the inventory and then left the room while the participants
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completed the measures. The total BDI scores were used to determine each participant’s
mood group. The cut-off scores in this study for mood group classification were the
same as Study 1.
Debriefing. Participants were debriefed thoroughly by the experimenter at the
end of the session, including an explanation of the deception in the study and the reasons
why it was necessary. Participants were assured that the feedback they received had no
merit and that the experimenter had no knowledge of speech abilities. Participants were
requested to refrain from discussing the study with others until the end of the academic
year. The participants received a debriefing form which included information about the
purpose of deception in psychological studies, referral information, and contact
information in case of future concerns. All questions and concerns were addressed at the
time of debriefing, and no participants made future contact.
Results
This study had two between-subjects factors, mood group (non-depressed and
depressed) and information condition (no corrective information, corrective information),
and one within-subjects factor (inferences for first speech and second speech). The
dependent variables are described below. The means and standard deviations for these
dependent variables are presented in Table 5, participants’ average self-ratings are
compared to Dr. Mason’s ratings in Table 6, and the correlations between these
dependent variables are presented in Tables 7 – 9.
Dependent Variables
Participants’ self-ratings for speeches. After giving their first speech,
participants were asked to rate their speech on four content dimensions and four
presentation dimensions. Table 6 provides means and standard deviations for
participants’ ratings of their own speeches and also shows the feedback that all
participants received “from Dr. Mason.” The average of these content ratings (“Content
Rating at Time 1”) and the average of these presentation ratings (“Presentation Rating at
Time 1”) were summed together (“Total Time 1 Ratings”). Higher scores indicated more
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Condition Mood Group Mean Std. Deviation N
Non-Dep 8.17 2.62 49
Dep 8.63 3.34 10
No Corrective
Total 8.25 2.73 59
Non-Dep 9.20 3.46 41
Dep 10.50 1.62 13
Corrective
Total 9.51 3.15 54
Non-Dep 8.64 3.06 90







Total 8.85 3.00 113
Non-Dep 11.96 2.77 49
Dep 11.70 3.31 10
No Corrective
Total 11.92 2.84 59
Non-Dep 12.07 3.03 41
Dep 13.52 2.02 13
Corrective
Total 12.42 2.87 54
Non-Dep 12.01 2.87 90







Total 12.16 2.85 113
Non-Dep 22.20 5.07 49
Dep 19.70 5.48 10
No Corrective
Total 21.78 5.18 59
Non-Dep 19.66 4.96 41
Dep 21.77 3.86 13
Corrective
Total 20.17 4.77 54
Non-Dep 21.04 5.15 90
Dep 20.87 4.63 23
Total Validity Score
Total
Total 21.01 5.03 113
Note: Higher scores represent more positive self-ratings and higher perceptions of
validity.
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Ratings and Dr. Mason’s Ratings
Self-Ratings Dr. Mason’s Ratings
Content
Content Dimension 1 4.41 (1.83) 5
Content Dimension 2 2.74 (1.77) 5
Content Dimension 3 4.76 (2.07) 3
Content Dimension 4 5.15 (2.14) 4
Time 1 Content Rating 4.27 (1.57) 4.25
Presentation Dimension 1 4.91 (2.15) 6
Presentation Dimension 2 5.23 (2.02) 3
Presentation Dimension 3 3.70 (2.01) 5
Presentation Dimension 4 5.48 (2.02) 5
Time 1 Presentation Rating 4.83 (1.76) 4.75
Total Time 1 Ratings 9.09 (3.15) 9
Note: Higher scores are more positive.
positive ratings by participants of their speech. A similar rating score was created for
participants’ second, hypothetical speech. The average of their four content ratings for
their second speech was summed with their average rating of their four presentation
ratings (“Total Time 2 Ratings”). Again, higher scores indicated more positive ratings of
their hypothetical speech. The comparison between the measures at time 1 and the
measures at time 2 indicated how participants used Dr. Mason’s feedback to make
inferential corrections about their speech abilities.
Participants’ perception of speech feedback. Participants were asked to rate Dr.
Mason’s feedback on the following dimensions: a) validity of the content feedback, b) the
validity of the presentation feedback, c) the overall accuracy of the feedback, and d) the
overall credibility of the feedback. The correlations between the validity items ranged
from .41 to .84. The reported analyses below indicated that the four rating items assessed
validity in a similar way. Therefore, the four items were summed together for each
participant (“Total Validity Score”). The variable represents participants’ perception of
feedback accuracy.
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A ContDim1 .52 .44 .46 .48 .53 .41 .39 .38 .40 .45
T ContDim2 .34 .38 .33 .32 .39 .33 .36 .34 .30 .38
ContDim3 .53 .44 .57 .57 .60 .46 .43 .40 .46 .49
T ContDim4 .48 .44 .47 .56 .55 .46 .44 .43 .45 .50
I ContAvg .59 .53 .58 .61 .65 .52 .51 .49 .51 .57
M PresDim1 .39 .39 .44 .43 .47 .44 .37 .34 .42 .44
E PresDim2 .49 .49 .51 .53 .57 .51 .48 .45 .51 .55
PresDim3 .48 .45 .48 .44 .53 .38 .46 .53 .38 .50
1 PresDim4 .52 .48 .53 .53 .58 .51 .50 .41 .58 .55
PresAvg .55 .53 .57 .56 .62 .53 .53 .50 .55 .59
A ContDim1 1.00
T ContDim2 .76 1.00
ContDim3 .66 .69 1.00
T ContDim4 .68 .66 .81 1.00
I ContAvg .87 .88 .90 .89 1.00
M PresDim1 .58 .63 .62 .66 .70 1.00
E PresDim2 .56 .61 .65 .63 .69 .83 1.00
PresDim3 .54 .61 .70 .63 .70 .66 .77 1.00
2 PresDim4 .57 .60 .71 .71 .73 .70 .72 .72 1.00
PresAvg .62 .69 .75 .73 .79 .89 .93 .88 .87 1.00
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Table 9. Correlations between Validity items, Self-Ratings of Actual Speech (Content
and Presentation ratings at Time 1), and Self-Ratings of Predicted Speech (Content and
Presentation ratings at Time 2)
Validity 1 Validity 2 Validity 3 Validity 4
Validity 1 1.00 .84 .60 .54
Validity 2 1.00 .51 .41
Validity 3 1.00 .69
Validity 4 1.00
A ContDim1 .10 .05 .03 .06
T ContDim2 -.06 .00 .01 -.01
ContDim3 .03 .11 .03 .01
T ContDim4 .02 .03 -.01 .02
I ContAvg .03 .07 .02 .03
M PresDim1 -.02 .02 -.01 .02
E PresDim2 .03 .06 -.04 -.12
PresDim3 -.14 -.07 -.05 -.07
1 PresDim4 .00 .03 .03 .01
PresAvg -.04 .01 -.02 -.04
A ContDim1 .04 .05 .04 -.06
T ContDim2 .08 .08 -.03 -.05
ContDim3 .05 .04 -.14 -.10
T ContDim4 .04 .04 -.06 -.09
I ContAvg .06 .06 -.06 -.08
M PresDim1 -.04 -.08 -.01 -.05
E PresDim2 -.05 -.10 -.04 -.10
PresDim3 .06 .00 -.11 -.12
2 PresDim4 .05 .03 -.06 -.09
PresAvg .01 -.04 -.06 -.10
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Examination of Hypotheses
Hypotheses about speech self-ratings. It was predicted that depressed
individuals’ predictions about their second speech would be more negative compared to
those of the non-depressed group. It was also predicted that this effect would be greater
in the no corrective condition, compared to the corrective condition.
An analysis of variance was conducted on participants’ ratings of how well they
expected they would do on a second speech (Total Time 2 Ratings), with mood group and
information condition as the between factors and participants’ ratings of their first speech
(Total Time 1 Ratings) as a covariate. There was no significant main effect for mood
group (p>.10) or information condition (p>.80). The predicted interaction effect between
these two variables was not significant, F(1, 159)=2.66, p=.105. However, the pattern of
means was in the expected direction: The depressed group was less positive at Time 2 in
the condition without corrective information and this mean difference was nearly
significant [F(1,82)=3.69, p=.058), whereas the groups did not differ in the corrective
information condition [F(1,76)<1].
To follow up these findings, separate analyses were conducted on participants’
content ratings and presentation ratings at Time 2, which were combined in the analysis
above. The analysis of variance on Content Rating at Time 2 was conducted with mood
group and information as the between factors and Content Rating at Time 1 as a
covariate. There was no significant main effect for mood group (p>.16) or information
condition (p>.36). The predicted interaction effect between these two variables was
significant, F(1, 159)=3.98, p=.048, and revealed the same pattern observed in the
analysis of Total scores: The depressed group was less positive at Time 2 in the condition
without corrective information [F(1, 82)=, p=.031], whereas the groups did not differ in
the corrective information condition [F(1, 76)<1).
Another analysis of variance parallel to this one was conducted on the average
presentation ratings at Time 2, with mood group and information condition as the
between factors and Presentation Rating at Time 1 as a covariate. There were no
significant main or interaction effects.
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The analyses on the content and presentation ratings at Time 1 were conducted
again with the exclusion of participants who rated themselves as negatively as or more
negatively than Dr. Mason to examine the impact of feedback that was relatively more
negative than participants’ own evaluations on future speech predictions. The findings
were in the same pattern as the above findings, but neither of these analyses revealed
significant main or interaction effects. The implications of these findings and the general
issue of feedback negativity will be discussed further in the discussion chapter.
Hypotheses about validity measure. It was predicted that both mood groups
would consider Dr. Mason’s feedback as less valid in the corrective information
condition compared to the no corrective information condition. It was also expected that
this difference in perception of the feedback between the two information conditions
would be greater for the depressed group.
An analysis of variance was conducted on participants’ perception of Dr. Mason’s
feedback (Total Validity Scores), with mood group and information condition as the
between factors and participants’ ratings of their first speech (Total Time 1 Ratings) as a
covariate. The main effects for mood group (p>.83) and information condition (p>.79)
were not significant. The interaction effect between the two independent variables
closely approached statistical significance, F(1,108)=3.81, p=.054 . For the depressed
group, participants perceived Dr. Mason’s feedback as more valid in the corrective
condition (X=21.77, SD=1.37) compared to the no corrective information condition
(X=19.70, SD=1.56). For the non-depressed group, participants perceived Dr. Mason’s
feedback as more valid in the no corrective information condition (X=22.20, SD=.71)
compared to the corrective information condition (X=19.66, SD=.77). The depressed
group did not show a trend that was congruent with the predication that depression-
related uncertainty would increase in corrective contexts whereas the trend of the non-
depressed group was more congruent with these predictions. The unexpected findings
will be discussed further in the discussion section.
50
Chapter VI: Discussion
The presented studies investigated differences in depressed and non-depressed
participants’ judgments about the self-implications of negative events, in hypothetical
(Study 1) and simulated (Study 2) contexts. The purpose was to replicate prior findings
of more negative interpretations by depressed individuals, while providing evidence that
these biases can be mitigated by depressed individuals’ greater attention to contextual
information. It was predicted that depressives’ self-judgments would be
characteristically negative in the face of mildly negative and ambiguous self-relevant
information but that depressed individuals would show greater evidence of correcting
these judgments when mitigating information was provided. The results of Study 1 were
generally consistent with predictions, whereas Study 2 yielded inconclusive results. The
findings are discussed in the context of related research. Then the possible reasons for
the mixed results will be provided. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the
theoretical, research, and clinical implications of the current studies.
Summary of Study 1 and 2 Results
Replication of Past Findings on Negativity in Depression
Negative self-views play an important role in the onset and maintenance of
depression according to the contemporary cognitive theories (e.g., Beck, 1967, 1976;
Alloy et al., 1999). These theories posit that depressed individuals have a maladaptive
style of processing information and that this results in emotional distress. Supporting
studies have found that depressed participants make judgments, evaluations, and
interpretations about self-referent information that are more negative than non-depressed
participants (for review see Beck, Alford, & Clark, 1999). The current Study 1 replicates
this finding of negatively biased processing of self-relevant information. Conversely,
Study 2 revealed that the main effect for depression was not significant.
There are two tentative explanations regarding the emotional stimuli in the second
study that may explain the lack of results. The research on cognitive biases in depression
has frequently suggested the use of stimuli that are negative in valence and congruent
with depression-related concerns to investigate the pessimistic aspects of depressive
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thinking (e.g., Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996; Hartlage, Alloy,
Vazquez, & Dykman, 1981). The negative speech feedback in Study 2 was intended to
elicit concerns about self-worth in the depressed group and to result in negative
judgments about future performance demands. In retrospect, the intellectual and skill-
specific nature of the speech feedback may not have been effective for tapping into the
broader emotional concerns about personal worth, loss, and inadequacy in depression.
Also, the feedback may not have been sufficiently negative to trigger core, maladaptive
self-biases. This speculation is supported by Table 5, which shows that the speech
feedback was generally more positive than the participants’ own evaluations.
Findings about Inferential Correction in Depression
In Study 1, the effect of mood group depended on information condition, namely
that corrective information influenced the valence of self-judgments in the depressed
group more than the non-depressed group. The attenuating effect of corrective
information on pessimistic judgment in depression has been shown in studies on
depression and social judgments (e.g., McCaul, 1983; Yost & Weary, 1996). However,
the current study is the first to show that depressed individuals can also correct self-
judgments. The explanation is believed to be similar to that provided by Yost and Weary
(1996). Depressed individuals have a greater emotional need for understanding and
control due to their perceived deficits. It is expected that this motivated the depressed
group to attend to the corrective information and to make effortful adjustments to their
initially biased self-judgments about the personal meaning of the negative vignette
events. It should be noted, however, that this effect was not found on the Study 1
measures of inferential uncertainty and target phrase recall. This is surprising because
past studies with similar measures have shown that extensive and corrective social
information processing in depressed groups are associated with more recall of available
information and less certainty about social judgments (e.g., Gleicher & Weary, 1991; von
Hecker & Meiser, 2005). Future studies are necessary with measures or methods that
may better detect the mechanisms for inferential correction in depression.
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Unlike the major findings of the first study, the second study did not support
predictions about inferential correction in depression. It was predicted that both mood
groups would evaluate a second performance more positively than the first speech
performance, but this difference was expected to be greater for the depressed group in the
corrective condition compared to the depressed group in the no corrective condition. The
mixed model ANOVA on actual and future speech evaluations did not reveal the
predicted interaction between mood group and information condition. These findings
indicate that negative performance feedback had a similar effect on subsequent self-
evaluations in depression, regardless of whether corrective information was available or
not. This is different from Study 1’s finding that negative hypothetical events were
judged less negatively by the depressed group when corrective information was available,
compared to the condition without it. It is important to explore the reasons for these
differences before making conclusions about inferential correction in depression.
Explanation of Mixed Findings about Inferential Correction in Depression
Lack of Differences Between Mood Groups in Study 2
An important possibility is that a greater degree of corrective processing was not
revealed in the depressed group of Study 2 because there were no mood group differences
to detect. For example, it is likely that the deception task of Study 2 triggered a higher
level of motivated reasoning in the depressed group than Study 1. Several studies have
indicated that depressed individuals are more sensitive to and aware of subtleties and
details in their environments. One study showed that that the depressed group was more
accurate in identifying an actor’s truths and lies (DePaulo & Lane, 1999). Based on these
findings, it is possible that the subtle nuisances of the second study (i.e., one way mirror,
ostensible rater, false feedback, etc.) may have motivated the depressed group to engage
in a hypervigilant and effortful style of processing, whether in the corrective condition or
not. The overly effortful processing in the depressed group from the onset of the study
and would explain the overall finding that the depressed group’s judgments were not
influenced by corrective information, as there may have been no need for inferential
adjustment.
53
As mentioned earlier, another reason that there may not have been mood group
differences in corrective processing is that the speech feedback was too mild or unrelated
to depressives’ concerns to trigger negative biases. If negatively biased processing was
not activated in the depressed group of Study 2, then their would be less reason for the
overall self-judgments of the depressed group to be influenced differently by the
availability of corrective information compared to the nondepressed group.
Methodological Issues with Information Condition in Study 2
The corrective information in both studies was designed to facilitate a positive
change in participants’ evaluations of their future speech performance by compromising
the validity of the rater’s negative speech feedback. However, the mixed model ANOVA
on participants’ inferential change did not reveal this expected effect for information
condition in Study 2. The analysis on participants’ perception of feedback validity in
Study 2 also did not reveal a significant effect for information condition, further
indicating that the corrective information did not effectively modify the perceived
validity of the negative speech feedback. It may be that the information about the rater’s
adverse experiences prior to the study (i.e., getting towed) was not compelling enough to
alter perceptions about the negative speech feedback. Such a deficiency in the corrective
information would explain the second study’s failure to find inferential correction in the
depressed group.
Limitations in Cognitive Capacity for Effortful Correction
It is believed that cognitive capacity for certain types of effortful processes are limited in
depression because of an overall reduction in cognitive resources and an allocation of the
available resources to emotional concerns. Inferential correction is particularly
susceptible to these cognitive deficits because studies show that it requires a significant
amount of cognitive resources (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). It is possible that the
real life context of Study 2 exacerbated these cognitive deficits, hence explaining the
study’s failure to find inferential correction in the depressed group. The information in
real life contexts is inherently more complex and extensive than hypothetical stimuli.
Therefore, it is feasible that the depressed individuals were under a greater cognitive load
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in Study 2. It can be concluded from the mixed results of Study 1 and 2 that depressed
individuals can correct self-judgments in hypothetical situations but are too cognitively
limited in some types of real-life situations.
Summary of Conclusions
The findings of Study 1 support the hypothesis that depressed individuals are
more likely than non depressed individuals to correct negative biases in self-judgments
when given mitigating information. However, it must be noted that the measures of
uncertainty and recall in Study 1 did not provide evidence for the control motivated
explanations of the supported findings, and that the Study 2 results did not support this
hypothesis. It is unclear why the second study failed to show similar results. One likely
possibility is that the methodological limitations of Study 2 did not allow for the accurate
investigation of inferential correction in depression. Future research is necessary to
examine the factors that will facilitate and inhibit the correction of negative self-
judgments and the style of processing associated with depressed individuals’ correction
of negative self-judgments.
Importance and Implications of Present Studies
Extending Current Research and Suggestions for Future Directions
Since the cognitive revolution in psychology, it has been widely accepted in the
depression literature that self-cognitions play a major role in the development and
maintenance of the disorder. Regardless of its theoretical importance, few studies have
investigated the effects of depression on self-relevant interpretations, judgments, and
inferences. Furthermore, the existing studies on interpretive processes in depression have
provided inconclusive results. Some studies have found that depressed participants are
more negative than non-depressed participants, others have not found mood group
differences, and still others have found that depressed participants’ are more realistic than
non-depressed participants.
Researchers have suggested the development of more sophisticated
methodologies, such as the methods in social research paradigms, to reconcile the
disparate findings in the current literature on depressives’ judgments (e.g., Dykman,
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1998; Dykman & Abramson, 1990). In accordance, the current research applied a stage
model of social inferences (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) to the investigation of self-
inferences in depression. It was the first study to investigate the effortful correction of
self-referent inferences in depression, but the design also allowed for the assessment of
negative biases in depressives’ self-inferences. The current findings contribute to the
understanding of these disparate findings in two important ways. First, the results
support the existing conclusions that negative biases can influence depressives’ self-
cognitions. Second, the findings indicate that these negative biases can be ameliorated in
depression by corrective information.
One of the next steps for depression research is to examine whether depressed
individuals can also correct judgments in real life situations. One way to address the
previously discussed methodological limitations is to experimentally simulate one of the
vignette scenarios. For example, the researcher can stage a spontaneous party invitation
from one confederate to another in a group of awaiting participants and then ask
participants to provide explanations for the event. Another important area for future
research is to investigate the role of cognitive capacity and motivation in the correction of
depressives’ self-inferences. Cognitive loads can be implemented to investigate the
effect of limitations in cognitive resources on depressives’ corrective processes, and
studies with explicit instructions for participants to attend to or remember corrective
information can investigate whether depressed individuals can be externally motivated to
correct negative self-judgments. These types of investigations will extend current
knowledge about the factors that will enhance and inhibit more adaptive styles of
processing, such as inferential correction, than overly negative thinking in depression.
Theoretical Implications
There is a predominant view in the current literature is that depression is
associated with an overly negative style of thinking. The “negativity hypothesis” has
been spurred by the predictions of the contemporary cognitive theories of depression and
has been further perpetuated by the research supporting negative biases in depressive
cognition. Several authors have advocated for a more complex view of depressive
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cognition. Even cognitive theorists, such as Beck, contend that the negative effects of
depression on the outcome of cognitive processes is not pervasive and unchanging
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). The current research extends these discussions by
examining corrective processes as another way that depressive thinking may vary from
the conceptualization of rigid and negative thinking, and the results provide some support
for a more complex view of information processing in depression. That is, when required
to make emotional sense of the self, depressed individuals are influenced by automatic,
negative cognitive processes but and can also be influenced by effortful, correction
processes.
Clinical Applications
The concept of inferential correction can be used to improve many facets of
cognitive therapy for depression. Existing therapies focus on changing maladaptive
thinking, mostly by identifying problematic thoughts and by helping the client
reformulate these. The findings about inferential correction in depression provide
evidence for a fundamental, strength-based shift in these clinical approaches. Cognitive
therapists can adopt a less pathologizing role by conceptualizing and approaching the
“depressed client” as an individual with the propensity for negative thinking as well as
the impressive ability to identify the corrective aspects of a situation, rather than viewing
them simply as pessimistic individuals. Such a shift would greatly benefit the therapeutic
relationship in cognitive therapies. Therapists would approach the change process with
more positive regard and hope. More importantly, depressed clients would be more
likely to develop positive self-views, which is essential for therapeutic success (Adler,
1917; Beck, 1967, 1976; Horney, 1945; Rogers, 1951; Sullivan, 1953).
The concept of inferential correction can also improve clinical assessments and
treatment plans. The presented findings indicate that therapists must make two important
distinctions to fully and accurately assess a depressed client’s cognitive problems and to
develop treatments accordingly. The most obvious clinical determination is whether the
client has the cognitive skills for inferential correction. If these skills are lacking, then
traditional cognitive therapy techniques are appropriate for developing cognitive skills for
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more adaptive thinking. However, the findings of the current studies indicate that some
depressed individuals may already be capable of correcting maladaptive cognitions. In
these cases, cognitive therapists should assist the client in exploring and working through
issues that are negatively impacting their ability to make adaptive corrections to
problematic self-views. Cognitive therapists may need to borrow techniques from other
therapies or to develop their own innovative interventions. For example, narrative
therapies are excellent for exploring client’s meanings of “problems” and of identifying
potential losses that may be associated with making more positive changes. Journaling
about cognitively challenging situations may also aid in the process of exploring and
working through clients’ lack of readiness or willingness to change.
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Appendix A





In this booklet, you will see two narratives on the left 
pages and rating scales questions about the narratives on 
the right pages:   
 
The two narratives on each page will be exactly the same 
except for one phrase, which will be bolded.  Please read 
the two narratives and then circle your answers to the 





















When you get to your class, you notice that the grades for the mid-term 
exam have been posted.  There is a huddle of people around the bulletin 
board discussing the exam and trying to find their grades.  Quite a few 
students are looking through their lecture notes. As you work your way to 
the front, someone taps you on the shoulder.  It’s an old friend from high 
school, and you are both surprised that you had never seen each other in the 
class until now.  Before you get a chance to catch up with each other, the 
professor walks in and begins the class.  You can’t wait any longer to see your 
grade so you decide to take a quick peek.  You are surprised to see that your 
grade is low.        
 
Situation 2:  
When you get to your class, you notice that the grades for the mid-term 
exam have been posted.  There is a huddle of people around the bulletin 
board discussing the exam and trying to find their grades.  Quite a few 
students are talking about how tricky the exam was. As you work your 
way to the front, someone taps you on the shoulder.  It’s an old friend from 
high school, and you are both surprised that you had never seen each other 
in the class until now.  Before you get a chance to catch up with each other, 
the professor walks in and begins the class.  You can’t wait any longer to see 
your grade so you decide to take a quick peek.  You are surprised to see that 
your grade is low.        
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In the first situation, the low grade means that you are a poor student. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 
In the second situation, the low grade means that you are a poor student.     
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 











How realistic was the first situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                 NEUTRAL                             VERY  
 REALISTIC                                                       UNREALISTIC 
 
How realistic was the second situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
VERY                                   NEUTRAL                                   VERY 
REALISTIC                                                        UNREALISTIC 
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Situation 1:  
You and your roommate go to a coffee shop to study.  You want to focus on 
your work so you choose a table with good lighting. A few minutes after you 
get started, your neighbor from your apartment complex walks up to the 
table and says “I thought I saw the two of you!  What are you up to?”  Your 
roommate starts whispering about a big party this weekend and invites your 
neighbor to go.  The two of them discuss the plans, and your roommate 
mentions that they have to ride together because it is invitation only.  The 
party sounds like a lot of fun to you, but your roommate has not invited you. 
 
Situation 2:  
You and your roommate go to a coffee shop to study.  You want to focus on 
your work so you tell your roommate not to distract you. A few minutes 
after you get started, your neighbor from your apartment complex walks up 
to the table and says “I thought I saw the two of you!  What are you up to?”  
Your roommate starts whispering about a big party this weekend and invites 
your neighbor to go.  The two of them discuss the plans, and your roommate 
mentions that they have to ride together because it is invitation only.  The 
party sounds like a lot of fun to you, but your roommate has not invited you. 
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In the first situation, the roommate does not want to invite you to the 
party.    
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 
In the second situation, the roommate does not want to invite you to the 
party.  
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 











How realistic was the first situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                 NEUTRAL                             VERY  
 REALISTIC                                                       UNREALISTIC 
 
How realistic was the second situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
VERY                                   NEUTRAL                                   VERY 
REALISTIC                                                        UNREALISTIC 
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Situation 1: 
You have been working on a major project at work for months, and it is 
finally time to turn it in.  As you drop it off in your boss’s file, you overhear 
him talking about a fight he had with his wife last night. At lunch time, 
you sit with some co-workers and catch up on the office stories.  The latest 
news is that one of the team leaders is going to Europe.  The company is 
expanding, and the goal is to enter the international market by the end of 
the year.  You go back to your office after lunch, and your boss walks in 
shortly after.  He says “I got a chance to review your project this morning.  
It seemed a bit rushed and incomplete.”   
 
Situation 2: 
You have been working on a major project at work for months, and it is 
finally time to turn it in.  As you drop it off in your boss’s file, you overhear 
him talking about the coffee in the break room. At lunch time, you sit with 
some co-workers and catch up on the office stories.  The latest news is that 
one of the team leaders is going to Europe.  The company is expanding, and 
the goal is to enter the international market by the end of the year.  You go 
back to your office after lunch, and your boss walks in shortly after.  He 
says “I got a chance to review your project this morning.  It seemed a bit 
rushed and incomplete.”   
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In the first situation, your boss’s comment means that your project was not 
good. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 
In the second situation, your boss’s comment means that your project was 
not good.     
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 











How realistic was the first situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                 NEUTRAL                             VERY  
 REALISTIC                                                       UNREALISTIC 
 
How realistic was the second situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
VERY                                   NEUTRAL                                   VERY 
REALISTIC                                                        UNREALISTIC 
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Situation 1: 
You want to make your resume stronger because you will be looking for a job 
soon.  You decide to join an organization that is involved in student issues 
on campus. During the first meeting, the members discuss all of the plans 
and goals for the upcoming semester.  Once the meeting ends, you realize 
that you are not ready to go home yet.  You have had a rough week, and you 
would like to go out and unwind.  You notice that some people are chatting 
around the vending machine so you walk over to join them.  When there is a 
silence, you say “You know, I was thinking about going out for a while.  Would 
anyone like to join me?”  A few people are silent, and the rest decline your 
offer.   
 
Situation 2: 
You want to make your resume stronger because you will be looking for a job 
soon.  You decide to join an organization that is known for their intense 
work ethics. During the first meeting, the members discuss all of the plans 
and goals for the upcoming semester.  Once the meeting ends, you realize 
that you are not ready to go home yet.  You have had a rough week, and you 
would like to go out and unwind.  You notice that some people are chatting 
around the vending machine so you walk over to join them.  When there is a 
silence, you say “You know, I was thinking about going out for a while.  Would 
anyone like to join me?”  A few people are silent, and the rest decline your 
offer.   
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In the first situation, the group of people does not want your company. 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 
In the second situation, the group of people does not want your company.     
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                         NEUTRAL                             STRONGLY 
 AGREE              DISAGREE 
 











How realistic was the first situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                 NEUTRAL                             VERY  
 REALISTIC                                                       UNREALISTIC 
 
How realistic was the situation? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
VERY                                   NEUTRAL                                   VERY 
REALISTIC                                                        UNREALISTIC 
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Appendix B
Packet # ______    
 
Please provide the following information: 








Every day we encounter numerous situations.  For example, we go to classes, 
we buy products, and we have conversations.  In order to function through 
the day, we have to make sense of each situation by deciding what it means.
This questionnaire is designed to simulate the process of making sense out 
of everyday college situations. At the top of each page, there is a story 
title followed by a short story.  Read each of these stories, and imagined 
yourself in the situations that you are reading about.  Once you have read 
the story, answer the two questions that follow.  Then turn to the next page.  
ONCE YOU HAVE TURNED THE PAGE, PLEASE DO NOT TURN BACK TO 
PREVIOUS PAGES.  Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
Otherwise, please turn to the next page.       
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“YOU SEE YOUR MID-TERM GRADE” Story 
 
When you get to your class, you notice that the grades for the mid-term 
exam have been posted.  There is a huddle of people around the bulletin 
board discussing the exam and trying to find their grades.  Quite a few 
students are looking through their lecture notes.  As you work your way to 
the front, someone taps you on the shoulder.  It’s an old friend from high 
school, and you are both surprised that you had never seen each other in the 
class until now.  Before you get a chance to catch up with each other, the 
professor walks in and begins the class.  You can’t wait any longer to see your 
grade so you decide to take a quick peek.  You are surprised to see that your 
grade is low.        
 
In this particular situation, the low grade means that you are a poor student. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN
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“YOU GO TO A COFFEE SHOP” Story 
 
You and your roommate go to a coffee shop to study.  You want to focus on 
your work so you choose a table with good lighting. A few minutes after you 
get started, your neighbor from your apartment complex walks up to the 
table and says “I thought I saw the two of you!  What are you up to?”  Your 
roommate starts whispering about a big party this weekend and invites your 
neighbor to go.  The two of them discuss the plans, and your roommate 
mentions that they have to ride together because it is invitation only.  The 
party sounds like a lot of fun to you, but your roommate has not invited you. 
 
In this situation, the roommate does not want to invite you to the party. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN 
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“YOUR BOSS REVIEWS YOUR PROJECT” Story 
 
You have been working on a major project at work for months, and it is 
finally time to turn it in.  As you drop it off in your boss’s file, you overhear 
him talking about a fight he had with his wife last night.  At lunch time, you 
sit with some co-workers and catch up on the office stories.  The latest 
news is that one of the team leaders is going to Europe.  The company is 
expanding, and the goal is to enter the international market by the end of 
the year.  You go back to your office after lunch, and your boss walks in 
shortly after.  He says “I got a chance to review your project this morning.  
It seemed a bit rushed and incomplete.”   
 
In this particular situation, your boss’s comment means that your project 
was not good. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN 
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“YOU JOIN AN ORGANIZATION” Story 
 
You want to make your resume stronger because you will be looking for a job 
soon.  You decide to join an organization that is known for their intense work 
ethics.  During the first meeting, the members discuss all of the plans and 
goals for the upcoming semester.  Once the meeting ends, you realize that 
you are not ready to go home yet.  You have had a rough week, and you would 
like to go out and unwind.  You notice that some people are chatting around 
the vending machine so you walk over to join them.  When there is a silence, 
you say “You know, I was thinking about going out for a while.  Would anyone 
like to join me?”  A few people are silent, and the rest decline your offer.   
 
In this situation, the group of people does not want your company.           
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  




Packet # ______    
 









Every day we encounter numerous situations.  For example, we go to classes, 
we buy products, and we have conversations.  In order to function through 
the day, we have to make sense of each situation by deciding what it means.
This questionnaire is designed to simulate the process of making sense out 
of everyday college situations. At the top of each page, there is a story 
title followed by a short story.  Read each of these stories, and imagined 
yourself in the situations that you are reading about.  Once you have read 
the story, answer the two questions that follow.  Then turn to the next page.  
ONCE YOU HAVE TURNED THE PAGE, PLEASE DO NOT TURN BACK TO 
PREVIOUS PAGES.  Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  
Otherwise, please turn to the next page.       
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“YOU SEE YOUR MID-TERM GRADE” Story 
 
When you get to your class, you notice that the grades for the mid-term 
exam have been posted.  There is a huddle of people around the bulletin 
board discussing the exam and trying to find their grades.  Quite a few 
students are talking about how tricky the exam was.  As you work your way 
to the front, someone taps you on the shoulder.  It’s an old friend from high 
school, and you are both surprised that you had never seen each other in the 
class until now.  Before you get a chance to catch up with each other, the 
professor walks in and begins the class.  You can’t wait any longer to see your 
grade so you decide to take a quick peek.  You are surprised to see that your 
grade is low.        
 
In this particular situation, the low grade means that you are a poor student. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN
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“YOU GO TO A COFFEE SHOP” Story 
 
You and your roommate go to a coffee shop to study.  You want to focus on 
your work so you tell your roommate not to distract you.  A few minutes 
after you get started, your neighbor from your apartment complex walks up 
to the table and says “I thought I saw the two of you!  What are you up to?”  
Your roommate starts whispering about a big party this weekend and invites 
your neighbor to go.  The two of them discuss the plans, and your roommate 
mentions that they have to ride together because it is invitation only.  The 
party sounds like a lot of fun to you, but your roommate has not invited you. 
 
In this situation, the roommate does not want to invite you to the party. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN 
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“YOUR BOSS REVIEWS YOUR PROJECT” Story 
 
You have been working on a major project at work for months, and it is 
finally time to turn it in.  As you drop it off in your boss’s file, you overhear 
him talking about the coffee in the break room.  At lunch time, you sit with 
some co-workers and catch up on the office stories.  The latest news is that 
one of the team leaders is going to Europe.  The company is expanding, and 
the goal is to enter the international market by the end of the year.  You go 
back to your office after lunch, and your boss walks in shortly after.  He 
says “I got a chance to review your project this morning.  It seemed a bit 
rushed and incomplete.”   
 
In this particular situation, your boss’s comment means that your project 
was not good. 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  
 CERTAIN                                                                 UNCERTAIN 
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“YOU JOIN AN ORGANIZATION” Story 
 
You want to make your resume stronger because you will be looking for a job 
soon.  You decide to join an organization that is involved in student issues on 
campus.  During the first meeting, the members discuss all of the plans and 
goals for the upcoming semester.  Once the meeting ends, you realize that 
you are not ready to go home yet.  You have had a rough week, and you would 
like to go out and unwind.  You notice that some people are chatting around 
the vending machine so you walk over to join them.  When there is a silence, 
you say “You know, I was thinking about going out for a while.  Would anyone 
like to join me?”  A few people are silent, and the rest decline your offer.   
 
In this situation, the group of people does not want your company.           
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 STRONGLY                                  NEUTRAL                                STRONGLY 
 AGREE                                DISAGREE 
 
How certain do you feel about your answer above: 
 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7-------8-------9 
 VERY                                     NEUTRAL                                    VERY  






This questionnaire is designed to measure how well you remember two of the 
stories you just read.  You may remember almost nothing, almost everything, 
or some parts really well and other parts not at all.  Please write down AS 
MUCH AS YOU CAN REMEMBER and AS CLOSE TO VERBATIM AS 
POSSIBLE (i.e. word for word).   
 
























On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of
statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group which best
describes the way you have been feeling the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY! Circle
the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements in the group
seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the
statements in each group before making your choice.
1. 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things
cannot improve.
3. 0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4. 0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5. 0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6. 0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
8. 0 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
10. 0 I don't cry anymore than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't even though I want to.
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11. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people.
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people.
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people.
13. 0 I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to.
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore.
14. 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make
me look unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.
15. 0 I can work about as well as usual.
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.
16. 0 I can sleep as well as usual.
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to
sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to
sleep.
17. 0 I don't get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
18. 0 My appetite is no worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
19. 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds. If purposely trying to lose
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds. weight by eating less,
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds. check here ___.
20. 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset
stomach; or constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much
else.
3 I am so worried about my physical problems, that I cannot think about
anything else.
21. 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.




Informed Consent to Participate in Research
The University of Texas at Austin
You are being asked to participate in a research study. This form provides you with
information about the study. The Principal Investigator (the person in charge of this
research) or his/her representative will also describe this study to you and answer all of
your questions. Please read the information below and ask questions about anything you
don’t understand before deciding whether or not to take part. Your participation is
entirely voluntary and you can refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled.
Title of Research Study: The Storytime Study
Principal Investigator(s) (include faculty sponsor), UT affiliation, and Telephone
Number(s):
Principal Investigator: Arshia Ebrahimi, B.A.
Department of Educational Psychology, Counseling
Psychology
Phone #: (512) 297-7252
Faculty Sponsor: Stephanie S. Rude, Ph.D.





What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to gain more knowledge about how people interpret
information about everyday situations.
What will be done if you take part in this research study?
First, you will you will read and answer a few questions about four short stories. The
stories will be about everyday college situations, and you will be instructed to imagine
yourself in these stories while you read them. Then, you will be asked to complete two
questionnaires. The first questionnaire will be about the stories, and the second
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questionnaire will ask about your emotional, behavioral, and cognitive experiences during
the past two weeks.
What are the possible discomforts and risks?
There are no anticipated risks involved in this study, but there may be risks that are not
known at this time. The stories are designed to replicate everyday situations that students
may experience during college. Therefore, some of the stories you hear may give you
negative thoughts or feelings. Others may remind you of a negative event or interaction
that you may have had in the past. If you have any distress during or following the study,
you are encouraged to contact now or call the Principal Investigator listed on the front page
of this form. The Principal Investigator will provide you information about possible
resources that may be helpful. Also, you may call the Austin-Travis County Mental Health
Services Counseling Helpline at 472-4357.
What are the possible benefits to you or to others?
The study will contribute to the literature on inferential processing.
If you choose to take part in this study, will it cost you anything?
There are no costs involved in this study.
Will you receive compensation for your participation in this study?
There is no compensation of this study.
What if you are injured because of the study?
The study involves no physical risks.
If you do not want to take part in this study, what other options are available to
you?
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to be in the study,
and your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with The University of
Texas at Austin.
How can you withdraw from this research study and who should I call if I have
questions?
If you wish to stop your participation in this research study for any reason, you should
contact: Arshia Ebrahimi at (512) 297-7252. You are free to withdraw your consent and
stop participation in this research study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits for
which you may be entitled. Throughout the study, the researchers will notify you of new
information that may become available and that might affect your decision to remain in the
study.
82
In addition, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin Institutional
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, 512/232-4383.
How will your privacy and the confidentiality of your research records be protected?
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin and the Institutional Review
Board have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the
confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law. If the research project is
sponsored then the sponsor also have the legal right to review your research records.
Otherwise, your research records will not be released without your consent unless required
by law or a court order.
If the results of this research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your identity
will not be disclosed.
Will the researchers benefit from your participation in this study beyond publishing
or presenting the results?
No
Signatures:
As a representative of this study, I have explained the purpose, the procedures, the benefits,
and the risks that are involved in this research study:
_____________________________________ ___
Signature and printed name of person obtaining consent Date
You have been informed about this study’s purpose, procedures, possible benefits and
risks, and you may receive a copy of this Form upon request. You have been given the
opportunity to ask questions before you sign, and you have been told that you can ask other
questions at any time. You voluntarily agree to participate in this study. By signing this
form, you are not waiving any of your legal rights.
_X_________________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Subject Date
_X__________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject Date
_X_________________________________________________________________




The purpose of the study in which you participated was to help the researchers
better understand some of the assumptions and inferences people make about information
they encounter in their daily lives. Previous research has shown that ALL humans
routinely make assumptions about information they encounter: We “fill in the blanks” to
make sense out of information we receive because that information is often incomplete.
A question we investigated in this study is whether making certain kinds of
assumptions/inferences—those that are unflattering or cast a negative or pessimistic light
on ourselves—is related to certain types of mood symptoms.
As part of this study, you answered questions about negative types of experiences.
In the process of doing this, you may have become more aware of painful feelings or
stressful life circumstances. Since most college students encounter stress and hardship
severe enough to bring about struggles with depression and/or anxiety at one time or
another, we are providing all research participants with phone numbers for services that
are free of charge to UT students. The UT Counseling & Mental Health Center (471-
3515) provides free counseling and information and referral to students by appointment,
and the UT Telephone Counseling and Referral Services (471-2255) provides 24 hour
telephone crisis support and referral information.
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Appendix H
SPEECH EVALUATION FORM        
Rater  ___________________________________ 
Subject # ________________________________ 
 
Please rate the following dimensions based on the following rating scale: 
 
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 
 Poor    Average          Excellent 
 Performance                             Performance 
 
Content of Speech: 
 
____ Introduction (gets attention, effective setting) 
____ Closure (summarizes, effective containment) 
____ Organization (cohesion of distinct points) 
____ Reinforcing Points (examples, persuasive associations) 
 
____ OVERALL CONTENT RATING 
Presentation of Speech: 
 
____ Posture (maintained poise) 
____ Facial Expressions (congruence with content) 
____ Distractors (no overusage, no non-communicatives ex: umm’s) 
____ Rate of speech (engaging, understandable) 
 
____ OVERALL PRESENTATION RATING 
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Appendix I
SPEECH EVALUATION FORM        
Rater    Dr. Mason
Subject #  231
Please rate the following dimensions based on the following rating scale: 
 
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10 
 Poor    Average          Excellent 
 Performance                             Performance 
 
Content of Speech: 
 
_5__ Introduction (gets attention, effective setting) 
_5__ Closure (summarizes, effective containment) 
_3__ Organization (cohesion of distinct points) 
_4__ Reinforcing Points (examples, persuasive associations) 
 
4.25 OVERALL CONTENT RATING 
Presentation of Speech: 
 
_6__ Posture (maintained poise) 
_3__ Facial Expressions (congruence with content) 
_5__ Distractors (no overusage, no non-communicatives ex: umm’s) 
_5__ Rate of speech (engaging, understandable) 
 
4.75 OVERALL PRESENTATION RATING 
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Appendix J
Participant Evaluation of Feedback
Do you think the feedback accurately represents…
the content of your speech: 1------2------3------4-----5------6------7
Very Very
Inaccurate Accurate
the presentation of your speech: 1------2------3------4-----5------6------7
Very Very
Inaccurate Accurate
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